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Management Information Systems
For the Smaller Business
The terms “system” and “systems” have been used with increasing
frequency in business writing in recent years. References are made to
“information systems,” “the systems approach,” “total systems” and “inte
grated systems.” To some extent the terms have been over-employed.
Certainly they convey no precise and generally accepted meaning. A
useful first step, therefore, will be to clarify the terms themselves and
to show what meaning is attached to them in this study.
A system is a set of interconnected parts through which some activity
is performed. In this sense there are many systems in any business
organization, of which one is an information system. The essential
activity performed by this system is the collection, analysis, summary
and storage or onward transmittal of data provided by the operating
systems of the business. A management information system, then, is a
set of data-gathering, analyzing and reporting functions designed to
ensure that management possesses the information it needs to carry
out its functions of planning, organizing, co-ordinating and controlling
the business. The full management information system is a very com
plex activity, however, and many of its constituent parts are themselves
complex activities. These constituent activities, such as the inventory
control activity, the operating budget and the forecasting of future
sales, will therefore be referred to as sub-systems and the overall man
agement information system will be thought of as a set of interrelated
sub-systems.

The work of the professional accountant is concerned mainly with
data and information flows. The mechanism through which the cus
tomary accounting reports, the income statement and balance sheet
are prepared is essentially an information system and has all the
features listed above. Information is collected, analyzed, summarized
and reported. The information produced, however, is designed pri
marily for external use, by state and federal agencies, by banks and
various financial intermediaries, and, above all, by the owners (and
potential owners) of the company. This study will not deal with this
system, but with a system which produces information for internal use
by company management in the planning and control of company
activities. The two systems are not entirely separate: Some information
produced for external reporting purposes may be used for internal
control, and vice versa. But the criteria by which the systems are
judged are in many ways different, and the “internal” system may most
conveniently be examined in isolation from the external.
The approach to management information systems used in this study
will be a “total systems approach,” but this term also requires clarifica
tion. The range of meanings runs from the need to look at all sub
systems before changing any one of them to, at the other extreme, the
completely centralized and simultaneous monitoring of every activity
being performed in the organization by a vast real-time computer. The
latter concept is intriguing but not yet realistic, especially for the
smaller business. The sense in which “total systems” will be used in
this study is closer to the former interpretation and synonymous with
“integrated systems.” The various sub-systems to be discussed produce
information which will be used as input to other sub-systems. Reports
produced will include information from any or all the sub-systems.
Obviously the form in which information is collected in the various
sub-systems must be compatible in terms of units of measurement,
meaning of terms, time-bases, and so forth. Care must be taken that
information is not collected in one sub-system that might more effec
tively be collected elsewhere. The implications that change in one
sub-system might have for other sub-systems must be considered. In
this sense the approach used will be a “total systems” one. It might
equally well be described as applied common sense. This study will be
essentially a cofnmon-sense approach to the design of management
information systems with special reference to the problems of the
smaller business.
The information required by the management of even the smallest
2
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company to enable it to perform its functions is varied and extensive.
Among the most important decisions to be made are those about the
company’s products, both existing and projected. Product decisions
require information about sales trends, market surveys and general
economic indicators. They also depend upon information about pro
duction costs to be expected at various levels of output. The production
costs cannot be compiled until information about purchased parts has
been obtained from the purchasing activity. Information about the
financial implications will also be required: information about the likely
increase in working capital, the cost of any additional capital equipment
which may be needed, and the effect of these factors on the company’s
overall cash ( and funds) flow. The estimate of working capital needs,
however, cannot be made until information is supplied by the produc
tion control activity about the inventory requirements associated with
the product or products being considered. Thus this single decision
problem amply demonstrates both the range of different types of infor
mation required and the interdependence of the sub-systems from
which that information will be obtained.
In subsequent sections of this study the information requirements
of the various activities will be considered in as much detail as space
constraints permit. Attention will then be given to the interplay of
these various activities as exemplified in their effect upon the company’s
future cash-flow planning, and it will be demonstrated that information
obtained from all these areas of activity may be combined to provide
a solution to a complex product-mix problem by means of linear pro
graming techniques. The case studies which form the latter part of
this technical study will demonstrate situations in which defective
information flows were resulting in inefficiencies and will show how
these problems were solved. A second study in this series will consider
a number of more complex problems in the design of information sys
tems and will give special attention to the use of EDP equipment in
information processing.
The criteria on the basis of which a management information system
must be judged are straightforward but vitally important. Complexity
is not one of them. The very small and very new business is likely to

suffer from a shortage of data; but in the more common case of a small
company which is growing and in which management functions are
being delegated from the founder-entrepreneur to lower supervisory
levels, it is more than likely that too many reports are being produced.
The criteria here should not be the number of reports in existence but
3

the usefulness of those reports. Management should receive just that
information which it needs to reach its decisions, and not a report filled
with unnecessary detail. Another important point, perhaps more diffi
cult for many professional accountants to accept, is that absolute
accuracy is not a requirement. One of the most vital criteria of an
information system is speed, and the requirements of speed and
accuracy will frequently be in conflict. Such a conflict should usually
be resolved in favor of speed, even though accuracy is reduced.
Information used as the basis for decision making must be up-to-date
and available when needed. An approximate estimate of the direct
labor cost of a projected product, available at the meeting in which the
decision to make the product has to be taken, is much more useful for
the purposes of this decision than a better approximation obtained at
the end of the first week’s production. Similarly, this latter figure is
much more useful than a labor cost correct to two decimal places made
available a month later. The chief criteria, then, are simplicity, speed,
reasonable accuracy and usefulness. To these may be added two
further criteria: economy and development potential. Considerations
of economy must not be allowed to override efficiency; the cheapest
processing method may be too slow and, in this case, the speed and
usefulness criteria would not be satisfied. Other considerations being
equal, however, the cheaper method is obviously to be preferred. Also,
although the system may be simple at this stage in the company’s
development, it must be one that can be developed as the requirements
become more complex. It should not be necessary to scrap the system
and start all over again. Even at this early stage, care must be taken
to ensure that all the sub-systems will be compatible with each other
when the information-handling workload is many times as great as it is
at present. Here too, the approach may be called a “total systems” one
in the sense in which the term is being interpreted in this study.
The essential features of an information system remain the same
whether the system is the simplest manual one or an advanced system
using sophisticated EDP facilities, and the same criteria may be
applied. Indeed, the existence of computer facilities often encourages
the preparation and circulation of unnecessary reports and irrelevant
detail. The criterion of “usefulness” must therefore be held very much
in mind when such a system is designed. Here too, the “speed” criterion
is important: The computer’s facility for rapid sorting and processing
of data may be lost if bottlenecks occur in card-punching or if updating
4
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runs on a particularly important file have been scheduled at too long
an interval. Computer-based systems may offer economies, but installa
tions which have been implemented on the basis of projected clerical
cost-savings alone have usually been disappointing. The major benefits
of the computer-based system are the reduction of clerical errors,
increased speed of processing and the ability to perform more sophisti
cated analysis than was previously possible. The experiences of some
small companies which have introduced computer-based systems will
be considered in the second study mentioned above.
The managers of a small company who are beginning to think about
their information needs and realize the importance of a systematic
approach to information handling are likely to turn for assistance to
their accounting advisors. Certainly this is an area in which the CPA
should be able to offer valuable assistance. Much of the information
will be familiar to him: costs, budget variances, cash flows. A CPA
who has some experience in management services engagements will
find little that is completely new to him. In reviewing the various
sub-systems, this study will assume some basic knowledge and will
emphasize the information flow aspects of the particular activity. Thus,
in the section on budgeting, the concentration will not be upon what
a budget is or the basic philosophy of responsibility accounting, but
upon the extent to which budget information uses and depends upon
information output of other sub-systems, and the extent to which the
budget itself forms input for other sub-systems. The closing sections
will then attempt to relate all that has gone before to form an overall
picture of the information needs and information flows in a small
manufacturing company.
THE PLANNING FUNCTION

Information is not an end in itself. It is important as the basis of
management decisions and of management’s continuing functions of
controlling and co-ordinating the company’s operations. None of the
decisions that management must make are more important than those
about the future of the company: where it is going and what business
it projects for the extreme limit of the planning horizon.
The planning function in a business organization may be subdivided
into three phases. The planning structure may not be based upon this
three-phase breakdown, but three distinct levels exist, implicitly if not
5

explicitly. The three phases may be identified as strategic planning,
long-range action planning, and short-range or operational planning.
At the strategic planning stage the company’s top management group
makes decisions which are “strategic” to the company; that is, those
decisions which will direct the broad lines of its activities and establish
the goals and objectives that will determine all operational decisions.
Thus, for a company whose business is automobile distribution, a deci
sion to obtain a franchise for an imported sub-compact automobile, in
addition to its existing domestic line, will be a strategic decision. A
new policy is established. No funds have yet been committed, however.
The second planning stage, the long-range action plan, is the stage at
which resource allocation takes place. This allocation is performed
within the context of the policies formulated in stage one. Thus, the
distributor having formulated the policy, “handle imported automobiles
in addition to domestic automobiles,” will make certain important con
sequential action decisions: to build new and enlarged showroom
facilities, to enlarge or re-plan the spare parts store and to recruit
additional supervisory staff. The time span of this phase will vary with
the nature of the business, but will usually take three to five years. The
final phase, the short-term operations plan, will usually cover a period
of one year or less. The plans made at this level will reflect those at
both of the foregoing stages. The operating plans of the automobile
distributor will eventually include provision for increased advertising
and promotional expenditures necessitated by the decision to handle
the additional line, and for additional salesmen and storekeepers to staff
the new facilities. Planning at this stage is closely related to the operat
ing budget and will be considered under the budget subsystem.
The strategic and long-range action planning activities are of
enormous and obvious importance. These are the phases in which
the management of the company makes and implements its “policy”
decisions. Such policy decisions are the means by which a company
responds to its environment. The environment includes both internal
and external elements. The internal environment comprises all the
factors in the organization itself: plant and equipment, managerial and
operative manpower resources, financial resources, product lines, d istri
bution network and so forth. The company’s strategic decisions must
be based upon a realistic appraisal of its own strengths and weaknesses.
A strategy designed to capitalize on its strong points and to reduce the
importance of its disadvantages has good prospects of success. Simi
larly, a realistic appraisal of the external environment is required. W hat
6
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do the economic indicators forecast—boom or recession? W hat are
competitors doing? Are there any signs of changes in customers’ tastes
or in the technology of the industry in which the company operates?
Such considerations are vital to sound strategic planning in any busi
ness organization.
The manager of a small business may perhaps delude himself into
thinking that strategic planning is not for him, that it is something
which staff specialists do in multimillion-dollar companies. Such a
view is completely erroneous. The failure rate of small businesses is
very high. Those which survive and grow do so because their strategy
is sound, even though the formulation of that strategy was informal
and implicit. Many smaller businesses which prosper do so by finding
a niche for themselves in which they are able to meet effectively the
competition of bigger rivals. Such a niche might be the provision of a
service in a local territory neglected by larger companies, the pro
duction of a luxury, special appeal or ethnic product for which total
demand is not great enough to interest larger competitors, or the
identification of a demand sector which competition’s products do not
completely satisfy. A further factor in the success of many small com
panies is flexibility: the ability to respond more quickly to emergent
trends and changes in demand than can their more ponderous rivals.
In either instance—the identification of a niche or the identification of
and quick response to new changes in the external environment—the
availability of relevant, timely information is clearly all-important.
The information flows relevant to the planning sub-system may be
summarized in diagrammatic form as shown in Figure 1, page 8.
THE BUDGET SUB-SYSTEM

Budgets are an important adjunct to the delegation of responsibility
in the small company as in the large. The delegation of a task to a
sub-unit implies that a goal has been set for that sub-unit. It is also
necessary to allocate to the sub-unit certain resources which are to be
used in attaining that goal. It is usual, when delegating a task, to set
various standards of performance. These standards are set in terms of
required quality, the time by which the task must be completed, and
the acceptable costs. By setting up a budget for each sub-unit, the
management of the company provides itself with a control device by
which it can ensure that the activities of the sub-units are directed
towards the goals indicated by overall company policy. By using budget
7

Figure 1
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variances and exception reporting techniques, management may be
sure that the expenses being incurred by the sub-units and the output
being produced by them are in accordance with overall company fore
casts and commitments. The kind of budget referred to so far may be
termed a “responsibility budget” and its primary purpose is control.
Another type of budget which may be used is the “product budget”
or “program budget.” A budget of this type might deal with a single
product in a multi-product company or with a single type of service in
a multiple-activity service organization. Such a budget facilitates deci
sion making concerning the product, program or activity with which it
is concerned, by isolating all the information relevant to that particular
product or program, particularly information about profitability. This
kind of budget is used infrequently in the small company. It need not
be elaborate, however, and is well worth careful consideration. Its
prime purpose is decision making rather than control.
A further distinction needs to be identified between fixed and vari
able types of budget. In the fixed budget, a single figure is set for each
variable, based upon one particular targeted output volume. Thus, if
a company engaged in the manufacture of metal window frames has
a target output of 50,000 frames during the coming year the labor and
material cost per frame used for budget purposes will be based upon
the assumption that exactly 50,000 will be made. The variable type of
budget, on the other hand, recognizes that output may fall short of
target or that the target may be revised upwards, and that the unit cost
will vary at different volume levels. A sliding scale of costs is prepared
for different levels of output and is used for budget purposes. The
variable budget system, though it is somewhat more expensive to
design, may considerably facilitate management’s interpretation of re
sponsibility budget figures and is also relevant to many product budget
systems.
In addition to using budget information for control and decision
making purposes, management may also use it for co-ordination. The
activities of the various sub-units are closely interdependent. Co-ordi
nation is required both at the planning and at the operating stages. In
planning, it will be necessary to ensure that the full implications of
goals set for one sub-unit are understood by and included in the
budget of all other units affected. This is particularly important when
volumes are increasing. An operating budget for the manufacturing
activity with a production target 10 per cent above existing volumes
will cause confusion unless the sales department’s budget is also based
9

upon the revised figure. Co-ordination of targets, therefore, is vital. At
the operating stage an equal degree of co-ordination is required because
target figures are never exactly met. Problems arise, shortages and
breakdowns occur, and “specials” and “rush jobs” are accepted. Thus
there is an ever-present tendency for the activities to become out of
phase, with dire results: Sales people, for instance, may make delivery
promises which the production activity cannot fulfill. The co-ordinat
ing task, then, is an on-going one and represents a vital and continued
information need.
The budget sub-system is composed of a number of distinct parts
which can be called sub-systems themselves. The principal parts may
include some or all of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

The sales budget
The selling and administrative expense budget
The labor budget
The direct-materials budget
The maintenance and consumable stores budget
The overhead budget
The manufacturing budget ( combining 3 through 6 above)
The capital equipment budget
The purchasing budget
The research and development budget
The cash budget

In the very small company it is unlikely that all these separate budgets
will exist. Nevertheless, all these activities will exist in some rudi
mentary form, and a budget system for the company must make allow
ance for them somewhere. They may, however, be defined under fewer
headings, perhaps simply a sales budget, a factory or manufacturing
budget, a general office budget and a cash budget.
One most important point about the budget sub-system, for the
purposes of this study, is that the various constituent budgets are closely
united in that the output of one budget becomes the input for another.
They are therefore linked together in a predetermined sequence with
critical timing requirements. The sales budget, which comes first, is
broken down by product lines where more than one product exists. The
input for the sales budget will be management’s strategic objectives
and long-range plans. The sales budget itself will in turn provide infor
mation input for the manufacturing budget. The manufacturing budget
10
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then becomes input for the purchasing budget and, to a lesser extent,
the general office or general expense budget. Finally, the other budgets
become input for the cash budget, which draws information about
expected revenues from the sales budget and about expected expendi
tures from all sources. In effect, a cash budget cannot be prepared
until all other budgets are complete. A timetable for the completion
of key stages in the budgeting process is obviously necessary. And
again, the need for continuing co-ordination becomes clear. Because
the purchasing budget is input for the cash budget, an increase in a
supplier’s price for any component or material will result in changes
in both the purchasing budget and the cash budget. It may then be
necessary, if this increase in expenditures threatens to reduce company
cash balances to an unacceptably low level, that expenditures in other
areas be reduced, and that a reverse flow of information and revised
instructions, standards and targets be set in motion until a new cash
equilibrium is achieved.
The high degree of interchange of information emphasizes the degree
to which the system must be an “integrated” one in terms of standardi
zation of measurements also. The need for standardized time bases is
obvious: The sales budget would be of limited use as the basis of
manufacturing plans if the sales department estimates were based upon
calendar months while manufacturing was based upon 13 standardized
28-day production periods. Equally important is standardization of any
classifications upon which demand analysis is based. Consider the case
of a small company which publishes and distributes a weekly magazine
devoted to investment advice. The expected total sales per period is
vital information to all areas. The sales department might wish to break
down that forecast into subtotals by type of subscriber: private indi
viduals, educational institutions, financial institutions. To the purchas
ing officer, responsible for buying paper, a more meaningful breakdown
might be “regular edition—airmail edition,” and for the accounting
staff member in charge of cash planning, the most important division
would be between newsstand sales and subscriptions.
In addition to this complex interchange of internally generated infor
mation, the budget sub-system will make extensive use of “external”

information. The sales budget will be based in large part upon such
outside information as: economic indicators, announcements about the
programs of industrial customers, forecasts of consumers’ disposable
incomes, and so forth. The manufacturing budget will make use of
external information about wage rate trends in the industry. The
11

purchasing budget must take account of any expected changes in rele
vant raw material costs. Such information will inevitably be less
detailed and more uncertain than internal information, but is usually
more important because it arises from factors over which company
management has no control.

COST INFORMATION

Information about costs and cost expenditures is certainly as impor
tant as any other information produced in a company. It is used for
four principal purposes:
1. To make product-line decisions
2. To set product prices and determine distribution policies
3. To ensure that actual expenditures are kept as close as possible to
budget
4. To help measure the performance of supervisory staff
The use of cost information in product-line, pricing and distribution
decisions has already been examined in some detail in technical
studies prepared earlier in this series.1 The different possible bases
upon which items of overhead cost may be allocated and the leading
considerations in the question of “full” costing versus “contribution”
costing are treated in detail in those studies and will not be repeated
here. Three points made in those studies, however, are of very basic
importance and have considerable implications for information systems;
therefore, they will be restated briefly.
The first point is that the use of full-cost pricing with allocation of
all fixed costs to some product or other will not ensure that all fixed
costs are in fact covered in some magical way. The real value of fullcost allocation is “primarily in its use as a diagnostic device for manage
ment. Management must examine the production, distribution and
sales aspects of a product to find out whether the product is capable of
carrying its share of the capacity costs.”2
1 See M anagem ent Services Technical Study No. 1, “Cost Analysis for
Product Line Decisions” (AICPA, New York, 1965), and M anagem ent
Services Technical Study No. 2, “Cost Analysis for Pricing and Distribution
Policies” (AICPA, New York, 1965).
2 MSTS No. 1, “Cost Analysis for Product Line Decisions,” p. 14.
12
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The second point is that there is no one correct product cost. The
total unit cost of a product is a function of production volume, and it
changes as that volume changes: ". . Neither fully allocated costs nor
variable costs are an accurate measure of the effect of dropping a prod
uct; an accurate estimate can only be made by a special analysis. . . .
The safest generalization is that there is no substitute for a specific
analysis of the costs and revenues associated with the particular action
under consideration.”3
Thirdly, the point is made that the establishment of product prices
is likely to be a two-stage process. In the first stage a “desired” price is
determined on the basis of internal cost information. This is the price
which would cover all costs allocated to the product and still provide a
target rate of profit. The second stage is the process of modifying this
ideal or desired price into a realistic market price on the basis of external
information about competitors’ prices and sales conditions. “The meas
ure of the success of a pricing formula is whether it works or not, i.e.
whether or not the company is successful in receiving a volume of busi
ness which, in the eyes of management, is appropriate under the eco
nomic circumstances that exist at a given point in time. If the formula
is not successful when measured by these standards, it should be
changed.”4
The implications of all this for the design of management information
systems are considerable. Cost information is perhaps the prime basis
upon which pricing and product-line decisions will be made. These
decisions are among the most important made in a company. But no
universal ready-made formula exists which may be used to indicate just
what costs should be used and how they should be calculated. For each
decision the question must be asked, “W hat costs and what method of
allocation are relevant to this decision?” and the information collected
will depend upon the answer to this question. This is likely to be one
of the least “systematic” information flows in the information system.
Moreover, the ultimate decision, especially in pricing problems, will
depend upon external information as well as internal. This is one of
the many areas in which the function of scanning the external environ
ment is an important part of the management information system.

3 Ibid, p. 23.
4 MSTS No. 2, “Cost Analysis for Pricing and D istribution Policies,” p. 35.
13

Internal Cost Control

Cost information is also used to determine whether the company’s
profit targets are achieved ( assuming that planned volume is attained)
by comparing actual expenditures with the costs upon which product
prices and the departmental budgets were based. The target volume
established in the sales budget is therefore critically important, espe
cially when the variable budget approach is not used. Failure to base
costs on a realistic output-volume target is not an uncommon fault in
small businesses. The results are likely to be disastrous. Breakeven
volume is not achieved, and actual unit production costs are found to
be considerably greater than those used in the breakeven calculation.
A handsome expected profit turns into a realized loss and management
realizes, belatedly, that if more realistic cost figures had been available,
the product-line decision would have been not to manufacture the
product.
Thus, the use of costs as a means of control is closely bound up with
the budget sub-system. The manufacturing budget incorporates certain
output figures taken from the sales budget (and modified in the light
of any planned changes in inventory levels). It also includes target
figures for the totals of various manufacturing costs on the basis of these
outputs. These total-cost targets are obtained by multiplying the num
bers of units to be produced by standard unit costs. The determination
of these standard costs is of great importance in the costing system.
Some small manufacturers do not employ standard costs. If the manu
facturing activity is primarily a “job shop,” performing custom jobs to
special order, then standard costing may not be appropriate. However,
standard cost information may be required for pricing or preparing bids.
But whenever any kind of repetitive operation is performed, in either
a manufacturing or a service organization, a standard-cost system offers
considerable benefits and its use should be encouraged.

The Design and Construction of Standard-Cost Systems

The standard-cost system will be very complicated and sophisticated
in a large company producing a range of complex products and using a
variable budget system. In such a company there will be accounting
and industrial engineering staff members whose time may be largely
devoted to maintaining the system. The smaller company does not
14
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possess these “staff” resources or need them. Its standard-cost system
may be both simple and effective. Much of the information required
will already exist in various places within the company. Engineers and
supervisors will be able to provide realistic estimates of the materials
and labor contents of various jobs, and though these are less accurate
than good time-study figures, they are better than no standard costs at
all. The company’s CPA may well be called upon to advise in the set
ting up of such a system. The basic rule is that no one ready-made
system can be used in all companies and in all circumstances. The
system must be tailored to the needs of the company, to its size, and
to the human resources which will be available to operate it.
The design of a standard-cost system is not a once-for-all task. Fre
quent modifications will be required. Volumes will change, and costs
must be modified accordingly. Specifications will be altered; new mate
rials will be substituted; new equipment will be introduced. Any of
these changes may make existing standards obsolete and require revi
sion and updating. The lack of staff activities in the smaller company
makes it particularly important that the responsibility for maintaining
and updating standards in each area be clearly and definitely delegated
to one person, even though that person’s other duties may well be in a
“line” rather than a “staff” activity.

The Use of Variances

The process of controlling company operations through costs is essen
tially one of comparing the actual costs with the standard costs to
determine the difference between them. This difference is termed a
variance. When actual cost is less than standard, it is called a “favor
able” variance. When actual cost exceeds standard, the variance is
“unfavorable.” The variance is a valuable indication of whether or not
production and expenditures are being held close to their budgeted
target figures. Two aspects of the comparison variance calculation
activity are significant for the purposes of the management information
system: first, the collection and summarizing of actual cost and output
figures for use in the comparison, and second, the question of what
variances should be reported, in what detail, and to whom.
The collection of actual cost and output information deserves careful
study because many economies are possible in this field. This is an area
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in which data being collected for conventional “accounting” purposes
may often be used for internal “management information” purposes.
The documents on which direct labor time is recorded for payroll pur
poses may be made to provide additional useful information by ensur
ing that an operation code, job number or product code is entered
against all time booked. Similarly, documents used for other internal
purposes may be utilized in the variance calculation also. The “shop
orders” used by the production control department to route jobs through
the plant may be used to collect direct-materials usage and spoilage
information. Additional copies of purchase orders may provide data
on actual prices paid for purchased parts and materials.

Variance Reporting and Management by Exception

Three points must be stressed here.
1. Management does not need to know about every cost and output
figure in the plant every day. It does not even need to be informed
every time a variance is reported. Management does want to be in
formed, however, whenever there is an indication that something is
getting badly out of line —i.e., whenever a major variance occurs.
2. In such cases, management needs to know not only how large the
variance is, but why it occurred.
3. Variances are reported so that corrective action may be taken. If
a variance is worth reporting at all it is worth reporting immediately.
No ready-made rules can be given as to what constitutes a “signifi
cant” variance. Common-sense standards must be worked out within
each company on the basis of the situation within that company. In
large companies, the staff specialists may use statistical techniques to
calculate “action limits” which trigger managerial action when costs,
production or spoilage reaches a certain level. For the smaller company,
such techniques may be useful but are not essential. In practice, the
exception-reporting system will tend to find its own equilibrium. The
manager who believes that his subordinates are taking up his time with
unnecessary detail is likely to make his views on the subject very clear
to them; so is the manager who feels that not enough information is
reaching him. In this way the company will develop a reporting system
suitable for its situation and the individuals concerned.
16
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When a cost rises so much that the increase is clearly large enough to
justify reporting it to senior management, the responsible supervisor
will be expected to have a good explanation to offer. In other words,
management will want to know what causes the variance. Assume, for
instance, that direct material costs during the past week are found to
have been 10 per cent greater than standard: a variance which would
certainly seem to require some corrective action. The variance might
arise from either of two causes: More material per unit is being used
(because of increased spoilage), or the price of the material has in
creased. The difference is very important for control purposes. The
price of the material is not a factor which the plant superintendent can
control or for which he is responsible. The amount of spoilage is
something for which he is responsible. Similarly, a major variance
might be reported in that highly critical area, the sales budget. Assume
that actual sales revenues are 12 per cent below those set as budget
targets. The discrepancy may be due to either of two factors: Sales
were lower than planned, or sales targets were achieved but at a selling
price below that used in the budget. Again, the difference is important
for control purposes. If sales volumes are down, management will want
to know if this happened because the sales department failed to sell or
because the plant failed to produce the goods requested. If prices are
down, the reason may be the actions of competitors and the plant is
clearly not responsible. To meet these requirements, the usual practice
is to report two variances in each case, a price or cost variance and a
volume, quantity or usage variance. The rules for calculating these
variances are:
Volume Variance = Actual volume minus standard volume
multiplied by standard price.
Price Variance
= Actual price minus standard price
multiplied by actual quantity.
It should be remembered that a single-period variance may include
elements of both price and volume variance. Consider this information
extracted from the direct-materials budget:
Actual
Budget

Volume
1,125
1,000

Unit Price
$2.10
$2.00

Total Variance =

Total
$2,362.50
$2,000.00
$362.50
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Using the above rules for calculation:
Volume Variance = (1,125 — 1,000)
Price Variance
= ($2.10 — $2.00)
Total Variance = Volume Variance
$362.50
=
$250.00

X $2.00 = $250.00
X 1,125 = $112.50
+ Price Variance
+
$ 112.50

The calculation and reporting of variances in this manner is not diffi
cult. All the input information required is readily available and the
calculations are simple and routine. The information produced becomes
an input for managerial decision making, and the separation of price
and volume effects presents this input to management in its most imme
diately usable form. The use of this system is therefore recommended
in any company which uses a standard-cost system, however simple
it may be.

THE PRODUCTION CONTROL SUB-SYSTEM

The production control area plays an important part in the manage
ment information system as both a supplier and user of information.
Production control activities may be divided into two principal areas:
scheduling and inventory control. The term scheduling is used here to
include a group of related activities: specifications and routing, machine
loading and material movement control.

The Role of the Scheduling Activity in the Information System

Scheduling is an important interpretative activity through which pro
duction plans are converted into day-to-day operating instructions. The
first stage in the development of production plans is management’s
strategic planning. One of the announced objectives in the strategic
planning of a small company in the garment industry, for instance,
might be to increase production of menswear and to reduce the impor
tance of women’s items in order to lessen losses and dislocations caused
by fashion changes. At the next stage, that of long-term planning, this
objective is translated into a definite plan to increase production of
certain menswear lines by a stated amount during the coming planning
period. The third stage, the short-term plan, converts the long-term
18

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR THE SMALLER BUSINESS

plans into specific weekly target figures in the sales budget, and from
there the target information passes to the manufacturing budget.
But unless the production operation is a very simple one or very
great reliance is to be placed in the production superintendent, a further
stage is necessary. This final stage, the production schedule, converts
the weekly budget production target into a set of detailed instructions
to production personnel, specifying which jobs are to be loaded onto
which machines or assembly lines at any particular time. In the smaller
company, this function is probably performed by the production control
supervisor and his assistant, using a simple visual plan board. Such a
system may be very efficient when the schedulers are experienced and
thoroughly familiar with the production facilities for which the schedul
ing is being performed. The output of the schedulers then becomes
input for the operational areas, and the role of the scheduling activity
may be diagramed as in Figure 2, below.

Figure 2

THE ROLE OF THE SCHEDULING ACTIVITY IN THE
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

Manufacturing
Budget and
Plan

Weekly
Production
Plan
Scheduling
Activity

Production
Operations

Production
Schedules and
Machine Loading
Instructions
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Inventory Control

The other major production control activity is the control of inventory
levels. The nature of inventories, the reasons for their existence and the
design of basic inventory control decision rules are discussed in Man
agement Services Technical Studies Nos. 6 and 7.5 That material will
not be duplicated here. In summary, however, the essential purpose
of inventory is to provide a “slack” or “shock-absorber” effect in the
company’s operations. If no inventories existed at any point, the timing
requirements of various operations would be impossibly precise. It
would be necessary for all purchased parts and materials to be delivered
to the plant at the exact time at which they were required by production
operations. When a product requires two or more sequential machining
operations, it would be necessary to have machine tools which all
required exactly the same amount of time or an exact multiple, to
complete the machining of one item, so that machine No. 2 would
become ready to accept the item just as operations on machine No. 1
were completed: clearly an impossible requirement. And it would be
necessary to schedule the completion of each item at the exact moment
at which it was required for shipment to a customer. These quite un
realistic conditions are avoided by building in inventory levels at vari
ous points. Materials and components are ordered and delivered in
economic batch quantities and form an inventory from which produc
tion operations draw their requirements. Stockpiles of semi-finished
parts are allowed to accumulate between machining operations, pro
viding a buffer which makes the exact synchronization of these opera
tions unnecessary. “Buffer” stocks provide protection against errors
and unforeseen eventualities in procurement programs, and finishedgoods stocks provide a reservoir from which customer demands are
supplied. In short, inventory reserves serve to decouple the various
stages in the procurement-production-distribution process.
The ability to satisfy demands and to meet delivery promises is im
portant to any company, but probably even more important to the small
company whose competitive advantage may be the ability to provide
better service than their larger competitors. The provision of inventorystock information to company management, so that emergency action
may be taken if finished-goods stocks fall to a dangerous low, will there
5 MSTS No. 6, “Practical Techniques and Policies for Inventory Control”
(AICPA, New York, 1968), and MSTS No. 7, “Techniques for Forecasting
Product D em and” (AICPA, New York, 1968).
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fore be an important link in the information system. This link is of
particular importance, since many small manufacturing companies tend
to be production oriented. Such companies give undue emphasis to
cost reduction and too little attention to realistic demand forecasting,
and may overproduce in their desire to achieve economic production
batches and runs.
Such overproduction is very likely to impair the company’s workingcapital position. In this situation, management needs to know what
amounts of finished goods are on hand and scheduled so that overpro
duction can be avoided. A warning signal may also be obtained through
a volume-variance report in the sales budget when production shows
no such variance, but direct monitoring is likely to be more effective.
This is particularly true in highly seasonal industries, such as fruit
canning, where production schedules depend largely upon the availa
bility of the crop and production plans cannot be established before
hand with any degree of certainty.
A further important information link will be that between the inven
tory control area and the purchasing staff. The calculation of inventory
levels and reorder points requires a knowledge of supplier lead times,
that is, the time interval between placing an order on that supplier and
receiving the goods. In practice, the stock clerk needs to know not only
the supplier’s declared lead time but how reliable he has been and by
what margin he may have failed to meet past delivery promises. In
other words, an approximate observed probability distribution for each
supplier’s lead time is required, and it is on the basis of this distribution
that buffer-stock levels will be established. This information is usually
available from the company’s purchasing staff, even though they have
probably never thought of their accumulated experience in terms of an
observed probability distribution. The link between the stock-control
activity and purchasing will usually be an informal one. Information
will be requested and passed by word of mouth rather than through
a written reporting system. It is nevertheless worth remembering that
any organizational change which promises to improve communication
between these activities is likely to result in benefits in terms of the
reduction of out-of-stock conditions.
SALES FORECASTING

The importance of realistic sales forecasting has already been touched
upon at a number of points. Sales objectives set in long-term planning
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form the basis of target figures in the sales budget and the entire budget
sub-system is based very largely upon the sales budget. In the fixedbudget system more commonly used in small companies, standard costs
are based upon one particular production level, and if sales fall short
of target figures and production has to be reduced, the existing standard
cost figures and any variance calculations based upon them will be
misleading.
Flexible budgets tend to overcome the problems inherent under such
restrictions, as they are based upon various production levels. This
method will provide for standards at various levels of activity.
The problem of sales forecasting is most difficult for the very new
business, in which there is little data available upon which any forecast
may be based. The most useful data for such a company is primarily
“external” data, economic indicators and forecasts of future consumer
behavior or new industrial investment. A company which has been in
business for some years, however, may be able to make very consider
able use of past sales performance data as a basis for forecasts of future
sales. These techniques have been treated at length in Management
Services Technical Study No. 7, “Techniques for Forecasting Product
Demand.” The forecasting methods explained in that study are fully
applicable to the small company, and two of the case studies included
describe the introduction of simple forecasting techniques in one- and
two-man enterprises.
One major complicating factor in the smaller business, however, is
that the chief executive in such companies frequently continues to
operate as the sales manager and chief salesman—often because of per
sonal contacts built up in the very early stages of the company’s history.
Such a chief executive will obviously be well aware of the importance
of sales. But he is also likely to be a very overworked executive. He
may fail to recognize signs of changing trends and tastes in the market
quickly enough. A system which relegates sales or at least sales-plan
ning responsibility to an executive other than the company president is
recommended even for the very small company.
One of the company’s best potential sources of information about
future sales, trends, changes in tastes and changes in buying habits, is
its own sales force. In the larger company this potential source is often
little utilized. The small company with its less formal structure is in a
position to tap this source of information and to receive the added bene
fits of a less frustrated and better-motivated sales team.
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CAPITAL EXPENDITURES *

Among the most “strategic” of the decisions that management must
make are those relating to major capital expenditures. Miscalculations
in this area will lead to undercapacity and to loss of orders, or to over
capacity with its attendant costs and inefficiencies. In small companies,
undercapacity is probably the more likely situation. A small company
entering upon a period of rapid growth is faced with demands both for
capital investment and for increased working capital. Working capital
requirements tend to rise more quickly than sales revenues. The com
pany is unlikely to be able to finance both capital investment and work
ing capital needs out of earnings. Borrowing, however, is more difficult
and more expensive for a small company than for a large one. It may
also be quite impractical to raise additional equity capital, because
there is not yet a wide market for the company’s stock or because the
amount of stock which would have to be offered would lead to unac
ceptable dilution of earnings per share or to loss of voting control. In
these conditions, the small company is very likely to be undercapitalized
and may even have an outstandingly promising product which cannot
be properly exploited because of shortage of investment funds. Small
companies in this position are very often quickly acquired by larger,
cash-rich companies looking for profitable diversification opportunities.
The reader may, while accepting the importance of capital invest
ment decisions to the smaller company, question why the subject has
been included in a study of management information systems. The
answer is simply that the company’s capital-budgeting decisions are
one of the three most critical and strategically significant uses of the
information produced by the system, the others being the pricing and
product-line decisions mentioned previously. None of the decisions
made in these significant areas can be any better than the information
upon which they are based.
Many books and articles on capital-budgeting problems and tech
niques have been written in recent years. Many of the writers dis
agree about the methods which should be used. The disagreement is
somewhat academic and concerned with points of detail, however.
There is a considerable area in which a consensus has been reached,
* T he reader should refer to M anagem ent Services Technical Study No. 4,
“Analysis for Purchasing and Financing Productive Equipm ent,” for a more
comprehensive treatm ent of this subject.
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and it is therefore possible to make a number of useful and practical
recommendations without becoming engaged in theoretical disputa
tions inappropriate to a study of this nature.
In many small companies the measure of investment often used in
evaluating and comparing capital budget projects is the “payback”
method. Every capital investment involves a relatively large cash out
flow at approximately the time the new equipment or facilities become
available followed by a return on the use of the new facilities, this
return taking the form either of additional revenues or of reduced costs
(or both). The “payback” is calculated by dividing the initial cash
outflow by the average annual after-tax return, giving an answer in
terms of the number of years of operations required to return the initial
investment. This approach has the merit of simplicity but little else. It
does not measure the true profitability of the investment, no account
being taken of, for instance, depreciation-allowance tax shields. The
major shortcoming of the payback method is that it fails to take into
account the time value of money. The “average after-tax return” might
produce the same figure from some very different patterns of expected
returns. Consider the three examples following:
Project No. 1
Initial Investment:
After-Tax Return:

Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Average Annual Return:
Payback:

1
2
3
4
5

$100,000
0
0
0
0
$100,000
$ 20,000
5 Years

Project No. 2
Initial Investment:
After-Tax Return:

Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Average Annual Return:
Payback:
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1
2
3
4
5

$100,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
$ 20,000
5 years
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Project No. 3
Initial Investment:
After-Tax Return:

Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Average Annual Return:
Payback:

1
2
3
4
5

$100,000
40,000
30,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
$ 20,000
5 years

In each case, the working life of the new equipment is assumed to be
exactly five years. The payback method indicates that all three projects
are equally attractive, but any practical businessman would surely
choose project No. 3 under which a major part of the funds invested
have been returned and are ready for reinvestment by the end of year 2.
In making this choice, the businessman recognizes that money does
have a time value, and that cash to be received in five years time is not
as attractive as cash available now.
All of the more recent methods of evaluation recognize the time-value
element. Cash to be received at some future date may be reduced to
its comparable worth in cash available now by discounting it. The
resulting figure is called the “present value” of the future sum. Methods
using this concept are known by the general term of the “discounted
cash-flow” approach. Two basic techniques exist. One, called the
present-value method, discounts the expected cash flows to be produced
by the investment, and the discounted amounts are then added to give
a total present value of the flows. If this total exceeds the initial outflow,
then the project is a profitable one at that rate of discounting and should
be accepted. The problem lies in the choice of a discounting rate; some
authorities argue that the company’s borrowing rate should be used,
others use its average cost of capital including equity capital, and yet
others look at its opportunity rate in terms of recent realized return on
investments in the company.
The other basic method avoids the need to make a decision on this
point. Instead, the outflows and inflows are listed and, by a process of
trial and error, a discount rate is found which exactly equates the dis
counted total of inflows with the investment outflows. This rate, and
the method itself, are known as the “internal rate of return.” The rate
thus calculated is useful chiefly as a basis for comparison with the rates
promised by other alternative projects, in which the projects are being
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ranked against each other to decide which of them to undertake with
the limited available funds. A number of elaborations of these basic
methods have appeared, some requiring the use of multiple discounting
rates. Argument continues as to which method is superior and in what
circumstances.
The situation probably appears highly confusing but it need not be.
The methods are not difficult, and using them is considerably easier
than choosing between them. A sound recommendation would be to
select the present-value method for ease of calculation. For most small
companies with limited funds and restricted borrowing opportunities,
the opportunity rate is, perhaps, the most appropriate discounting
basis. Tables of present-value factors at various discounting rates and
for various time periods are readily available. The points upon which
a consensus has been reached and which are here emphasized are:
1. Any of the discounted cash-flow methods are superior to the older
methods such as payback which do not recognize the time-value of
money.
2. In most circumstances the differences between the discounted
cash-flow methods are of little practical importance and any one of
them provides a reasonable basis for the selection of capital-investment
projects. The important thing is to select a method and then use it
consistently.
3. The most important question is not which of the discounted cash
flow methods should be used but whether or not all relevant inflows
and outflows have been included in the calculation as well as future
conditions and options.
This third and most important point emphasizes the extent to which
sound capital investment decisions are dependent upon an efficient
management information system. Some of the information used in the
calculation will be obtained from external sources. If a machine of a
new and revolutionary type is being considered, the suppliers will be
the only source of information, not only about the price of the machine,
but also its power consumption, life between overhauls, amount of
spoilage produced, and so forth. But in a majority of cases, the pro
posed equipment or facilities will be of a kind about which considerable
information is available within the organization.
The most important single figure in the appraisal of a proposed capi
tal investment, as in so many other business decisions, is expected sales.
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The project may in fact have been formulated because an increase in
demand for current products is expected and existing capacity is inade
quate. If the proposed investment is for equipment to be used in
connection with a new product or service, the estimate of sales will be
equally critical. A most important point is that many errors in sales
estimates for new products are essentially errors in timing rather than
in magnitude. A project is accepted and the equipment purchased, for
instance, on the basis that a maximum sales volume of $250,000 will
be achieved, two years hence. If the target volume of $250,000 is in
fact achieved, but not until year four, the project’s actual rate of return
is much lower than the project-evaluation calculations indicated.
Even when the sales forecasting has been accurate, expected rates
of return will not be realized unless the cost estimating was realistic.
Accurate and up-to-date direct-labor and materials costs will be avail
able from the standard-cost system, taking into account recent variances
and making any necessary adjustments. Spoilage rates on comparable
work will also be obtainable from manufacturing budgets. Explanatory
material in volume-variance records should provide information about
the incidence of breakdown and maintenance downtime for similar
equipment. Inventory records will provide the usage and cost of
replacement parts and consumable stores. If full use is made of the
information and practical experience existing within the company, then
few serious errors should be made in cost estimating for any products
or processes which are not entirely unfamiliar.
A number of other factors must be taken into account, particularly
the effect of the proposed investment upon the company’s liability for
taxes on income. Investment credit may be applicable and must be
included in the calculation. When new equipment will replace existing
facilities, a realistic disposal price for the old facilities must be esti
mated, and the tax effects of any book profit or loss on sale be taken
into consideration. The correct treatment of depreciation is particu
larly important. The depreciation allowance is not included in the
calculation as an outflow; this would result in double-counting, since
the full cash cost of the facilities would have already been taken as an
outflow. Only flows representing actual cash transactions are relevant.
Depreciation does have real cash-flow significance in terms of tax pay
ments, however. Depreciation is allowable as an expense in calculating
income for tax purposes, and the depreciation at the maximum permis
sible accelerated rate will provide a “tax-shield” effect which is added
to the after-tax earnings of the investment to give its total return. Two
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further factors require emphasis. If the proposed investment requires
a significant increase in working capital, the fact that funds will be tied
up in this way throughout the life of the investment needs to be in
cluded in the calculation. This is most readily done by regarding the
working-capital requirement as a cash outflow in the first year of the
project and as a corresponding (but discounted) cash inflow during
the final year. Finally, care must be taken to make due allowance for
the residual value of the projected facilities at the end of the cal
culation period. Clearly this is of prime importance when land is
included in the investment. It may also be significant in machinerypurchase projects in which the equipment is expected to have an eco
nomic life of 20 years, but management decides to evaluate the proposal
on a seven-year life because of the uncertainty of sales and cost esti
mates after this point. It might reasonably be assumed that such
machinery will have a considerable residual market value at the end
of seven years, and failure to include this value as a cash inflow in year
seven might result in the rejection of an attractive project.
In the light of the above discussion, it must be obvious that sound
capital-investment analysis requires the full co-operation of senior
management, planning staff (where such a staff exists), engineers,
accounting staff, manufacturing personnel and, of course, the sales
department. In many larger companies, the formal routing of capitalinvestment projects reflects these complex information and review
requirements. Projects originate with the plant engineering staff in
co-operation with the manufacturing area concerned and, in some
cases, are then passed to the plant accounting staff which calculates
the economic justification. The project next goes to the divisional
accounting staff which reviews it, checking the projected volumes with
divisional sales. Finally, it is submitted to an executive council or
capital-budget committee of senior executives which makes the final
decision. In the small company a much less formal procedure is satis
factory. Indeed, one of the advantages of the small company’s closerknit executive group and shorter lines of communication is that less
time is wasted on the preparation of capital-investment projects which
are ultimately rejected. The need to ensure that the information on
which the project is evaluated is the best available is even greater in
the small company, however, because the company’s survival may
depend upon the accurate evaluation of every single major capitalinvestment proposal made.
28

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR THE SMALLER BUSINESS

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

An earlier section of this study examined the interrelationships exist
ing within the budgeting system, and indicated how the planning
figures in all the various budgets eventually served as inputs to the
cash budget. This point is sufficiently important to be emphasized
further here. All the planned output volumes, revenues, expenditures
and estimated costs influence the cash balances the company will hold
at any point of time within the budget period, and the cash budget
cannot be compiled until all other budgets are completed. The account
ing staff then projects the expected levels of cash balances throughout
the period on the basis of the opening balance and the net effects of
all operations and transactions taking place in the company. The level
indicated at each point in time is then compared with whatever sum
management considers to be a minimum safe cash balance. In practice,
as a “first pass” the expected balance at the end of each month is pro
jected. If any monthly figure is disturbingly close to the acceptable
minimum, then weekly figures will be calculated for each week in that
month, and possibly even daily cash balances projected for a particular
“crisis” week. If, at any stage, the projected balance falls below the
minimum level, either plans must be laid for some short-term borrowing
within the period or some expenditures must be reduced or postponed.
One or more of the individual budgets is revised, and finally a satis
factory cash budget is produced.
The finished cash budget becomes a basic management-control docu
ment. The management of the company may safely assume that if all
inflows and outflows during the budget period are held to approxi
mately their target levels, there is no danger of insolvency or serious
cash inadequacy. If, however, it becomes apparent that some target
will not be met, perhaps because the market price of a product has
fallen or the purchase price of an essential raw material risen, then it
becomes a matter of great urgency to calculate the effect of this change
on the company’s future cash position. The cash budget-planning
figures —that is, the cash-flow forecasts —provide a vehicle for this
calculation. A very basic requirement of the information system is that
any variances which are expected to persist be immediately communi
cated to the accounting personnel responsible for the cash-budget and
cash-flow forecasting and that they in turn immediately communicate
to company management any indication that cash balances will fall
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to a danger level at some future time because of these departures from
the plan.
The following points are critical in the construction of accurate cash
budgets and cash-flow forecasts:
1. Income as defined for accounting purposes is not a useful concept
for cash-flow analysis. Accounting income is recognized only after
certain write-offs have been deducted, especially depreciation. A
reasonable approximation of net cash inflow may be obtained by adding
back depreciation to earnings after tax. For cash-flow planning, how
ever, all receipts and expenditures of cash should be entered individu
ally and no “income” entry will appear. Depreciation will enter the
projection only indirectly, through its effect upon income tax payments.
2. As in the evaluation of capital-investment projects, the timing
of flows is as important as their magnitude in cash-flow forecasting.
The treatment of sales revenues is particularly important as the major
inflow and usually the most critical variable in the cash budget. A
realistic estimate of sales, therefore, is not enough. The sales depart
ment —or more appropriately the credit department —must also fore
cast the percentage of cash sales, and the average time lag in the receipt
of payments for credit sales. A similar time-lag effect will exist in many
expenditure items, particularly materials purchased in companies for
whom trade credit is an important source of funds. These payments
will enter the cash forecast in the month in which cash payment is
expected to be made, not that in which the goods are received.
3. Most financial-planning work consists of making trade-offs be
tween competitive demands for scarce financial resources. Nowhere
is this more true than in the adjustment process by which the system
of budget plans is brought into equilibrium with cash-budget minimumbalance requirements. The decisions facing management in this process
are invariably difficult; in a typical situation, the cash-flow projection
may well reveal that the company may either put into effect a price
reduction which the sales department has requested to meet competi
tors’ actions, or undertake a projected media promotional campaign,
or purchase labor-saving machinery which promises to reduce direct
manufacturing costs or construct a much-needed cafeteria facility. In
many cases the discounted cash-flow techniques described earlier may
provide a solution, but where some projects are not independent or
cannot be expressed in terms of cash returns, the decision can only be
a “policy” one. There may be no obviously right answer. But manage
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ment may very easily find a wrong answer if the information upon
which it is being based is not the best that can be provided.
REQUIREMENTS FOR A
BASIC MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

The most important components in the company’s information sys
tem have been examined, and an attempt has been made to explain
why each is important and to show its essential interrelationships with
other parts of the system. This material may best be summarized by
listing the essential features and constituent parts of an efficient and
effective management information system for a small business.
1. The purpose of a management information system is to supply
to management the information which management requires in order
to:
a. Reach policy decisions, make plans and set objectives.
b. Exercise control over operations to ensure that those objectives
are achieved.
2. It is important that such a system be as simple as possible while
still achieving satisfactory performance and produce only useful infor
mation as quickly as possible, even at some sacrifice in precision.
3. The best information system is unlikely to achieve much unless
it is combined with sound strategic planning. The company’s long-term
plans will be the basis of the short-term targets incorporated in the
budget sub-system.
The information system is largely designed to implement these
objectives. Without strategic planning the entire process becomes one
of opportunism.
4. A sub-system of budgets is an essential part of the information
system. Budgets constructed on “product” lines provide information
which is directly useful in making product and pricing decisions.
Budgets based upon areas of operating responsibility are a basic tool
in controlling sub-unit performance. The budget is basically a timescaled performance target which the sub-unit is expected to achieve.
The budget sub-system for a small company may be very simple and
based on functional areas rather than operating sections or departments,
possibly just a sales budget, a manufacturing budget, a purchasing
budget, a general budget and a cash budget.
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5. A sound cost system is vital for two purposes: as a source for
pricing and product-line decisions and as the basis upon which manu
facturing budget targets can be determined. A set of “standard” costs
should be established. This need not require a prolonged industrial
engineering study. A useful first approximation may be based upon
estimates made by experienced management and supervisors. When
standard costs are established, they should be kept up to date.
6. The basic control procedure consists of the comparison of actual
costs with standard costs and of actual production/sales volumes
with target volumes. When the difference—or variance—is of critical
proportions, the information system must provide for its immediate
communication to management so that remedial action may be author
ized. When no immediate solution is possible, the variance must also
be communicated to the cash forecasting area so that its effect on the
company’s liquidity position may be projected.
7. Some further reports to management will be required in addition
to the budget variance reports. The most important are a production
report (weekly), an order-backlog report (weekly), a manpower report
including absenteeism and labor turnover (m onthly), and a return on
investment report. Any tendency to proliferation of such reports must
be resisted.
8. The information system should include a rudimentary production
control activity, consisting of an inventory control and, in all but the
simplest forms of activity, a scheduling facility which translates produc
tion targets into specific shop and machine-loading plans.
9. A set of rules for the preparation and evaluation of capital-invest
ment projects should be included in the system. Any discounted cash
flow method is acceptable. The choice of a method is less important
than careful selection of input data. This is one of the most important
uses of management information.
10. The various parts of the management information system will be
integrated in the sense that each individual part or sub-system will be
designed with the requirements of the overall system in mind. No part
of the system will be changed until the effect of the proposed change
on all other parts of the system have been examined. In this way it
will be possible to ensure, for instance, that the same time scale is used
throughout, and that the same product group classifications are
adopted. The need for integration of various sub-systems is empha
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sized by the dependence of the company’s cash-flow forecast upon
information from all sub-systems.
Finally, it must be emphasized that, however comprehensive the
design of the information system and however sophisticated its con
stituent parts, it will not achieve its objectives unless efficient channels
of communication exist in the organization. This is particularly true in
the smaller company in which the information system is not EDP-based
and depends upon continuing interpersonal communication across
functional and departmental boundaries. Good communications may
be fostered by managerial and supervisory committees, interdisci
plinary project teams and similar devices. Most important of all is that
the company’s top executives should announce—and demonstrate by
their own conduct—that company loyalty and the free communication
of information across traditional boundaries are more desirable than
sub-unit loyalty and secretiveness. Only in this type of environment
will an efficient management information system be realized.
The relationship of the component sub-systems and the most impor
tant information flows are summarized in the diagram in Figure 3,
page 34.

SOLVING A PRODUCT-MIX PROBLEM
W ITH LINEAR PROGRAMING TE C H N IQ U E S *

The use of sales-forecast information and of cost information in
product-line decisions has already received attention in this study.
When such data is available it is a relatively simple task to calculate
breakeven volumes for various selling prices, compare these with the
distribution of expected sales at each price level, and arrive at a
decision. The problem becomes considerably more complex, however,
when the company has more than one product line and management
wishes to determine the most profitable mix to produce in one particular
period. Add the further complications that working capital is limited
and that the various products require different proportions of machine
time and assembly time, and solution by “heuristic” or common-sense
* There are, of course, m any types of operations research formulas other
than linear program ing that use m anagem ent inform ation in solving m an
agem ent problems. This section is intended merely to illustrate a natural
extension into the use of m athem atical techniques.
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methods becomes exceedingly difficult. Fortunately, mathematical
programing techniques have been developed to provide solutions to
just such problems. The use of such techniques provides a most effec
tive example of the way in which any information bearing on the prob
lem, regardless of paperwork flow or organizational reporting patterns,
may be used toward a solution. The particular technique to be demon
strated, linear programing by the Simplex method, provides useful
information in addition to the product-mix solution: a series of “shadow
prices” which indicate the value of additional units of constraining
factors and are thus valuable input to the planning process. This type
of programing technique is very relevant to a study of management
information systems, both as a use of a wide range of information and
as a source of feedback information.
The present study will confine its examination of mathematical pro
graming to a fairly simple application of the Simplex method, in which
only two products are considered and the time span of the analysis is
limited to a single period into the future. A second study in this series,
in which more complex information-system problems and techniques
are considered, will include examples of linear programing solutions
with multiple products and with time spans of multiple periods into
the future, and will show how such techniques may be implemented
on EDP equipment.
The Simplex method of linear programing is a technique by which
problems involving multiple variables and a number of constraining
factors may be solved by the use of arithmetic after setting up the
problem in the form of a matrix. The theoretical justification of the
method is outside the scope of this study but can be found in Charnes,
Cooper and Henderson’s An Introduction to Linear Programing (see
Bibliography) and in a number of other basic texts in this area.
The formulation of the problem for a Simplex solution must include
an objective function and a number of constraints. The objective func
tion is the thing which is to be maximized; in most cases this will be
profit. Thus, if the company has two products, P1 and P2, and knows
that within a broad range of volume levels the profit per unit sold is
$50 and $70 respectively, the objective function would be written:
50P1 + 70P2 = Maximize
The constraints are more complex. In effect, they are the means by
which the realities of the company’s operations are introduced into the
problem. Assume that the company produces telescopes for sale to
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amateur astronomers. The two lines, P1 and P2, are both reflective
models. The mirrors are polished by company employees, then as
sembled into purchased body tubes and mountings. The principal
operations, therefore, are mirror polishing and assembly. All opera
tives are skilled at one task or the other, but not at both, and cannot
therefore be interchanged. The P1 model requires four man-hours
polishing and one man-hour assembly time. The P2 requires six man
hours polishing and two man-hours assembly. Obviously no solu
tion can be generated until the totals of polishing and assembly labor
expected to be available in the coming week are known. These are
respectively 190 and 72 man-hours. It is now possible to state that the
solution to the product-mix problem must fall within certain bounds.
The total mirror-polishing time, made up of four man-hours for each
P1 produced and six man-hours for each P2, must not exceed the total
190 man-hours available. This may be formulated:
4P1 + 6 P2 ≤ 1 90
Similarly, the assembly man-hour constraint may be expressed:
1 P1 + 2 P 2 ≤72
These expressions, however, are inequalities, and before they may be
used to generate a solution they must be converted into equations. This
is done by introducing “vector” or “dummy” variable. Let the variable
S1 represent that portion of the available polishing manpower which
is not used either for P1 or for P2 production, i.e., the time during which
the department is idle. Similarly, let S2 represent the idle time in the
assembly department. (In the solution, of course, either or both of
these variables may be zero quantities.) The two inequalities may now
be restated as equalities thus:
4 P 1 + 6 P 2 + S1= 190; 1 P1 + 2 P 2 + S2= 72
and these plus the objective function,
50 P1, + 70 P2 = Maximize,
provide all the information needed to produce a solution.
The Simplex technique of linear programing is not difficult to apply.
Simple problems may be calculated by hand, while the more complex
problems with many variables and constraints are readily solved by
using one of the many packaged computer programs available. All
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major manufacturers of EDP equipment offer library programs in this
area.
It must be pointed out, however, that the compilation of the various
items of data required as input to the formulas may be very much more
difficult than the mathematical operations. Many of the required
figures will probably not be readily available unless an unusually
complete management information system already exists. It will be
necessary to know, for instance, how many man-hours of assembly
time can really be expected to be available, and a satisfactory answer
cannot be obtained simply by multiplying the assembly workers by
the theoretical number of hours worked for the week. The data used
in the calculation must reflect average down-time for personal reasons,
absenteeism, time lost because of model changeovers and such. Simi
larly, available manufacturing time data fed into the formulas must
reflect the time likely to be lost through machine maintenance and
breakdown, tool changes, and so forth.
Where the required data is not immediately available it may be nec
essary to institute special surveys, work-measurement projects and sta
tistical analyses to obtain it. If the cost of obtaining the required
information seems likely to be prohibitive it may be necessary to aban
don the linear programing project. Where an efficient internal informa
tion system does exist and most of the required data is available, on the
other hand, linear programing provides a very powerful aid to mana
gerial decision making.
The last case in this study, Modern Wear, Inc., illustrates the amount
of detailed internal data that must be obtained before even a relatively
simple operating decision can be specified in the form required for
solution by linear programing methods. The reader is urged to make
certain that he understands where each of the figures used in the formu
lation of constraints in this case have been obtained and to think about
the implications of operations-research techniques of this type in the
design of management information systems in even the smallest com
panies.
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Lincoln Leather Company
On the afternoon of Thursday, August 4, 1967, Roger Lincoln, presi
dent and founder of the Lincoln Leather Company, called the com
pany’s production superintendent into his office. Mr. Lincoln was
worried about the company’s performance during the first six months
of 1967 and about the sales of their latest product. The pro forma in
come statement for the six-month period revealed an operating loss, the
first that the company had experienced in its 12-year history. Mr.
Lincoln was anxious to find out what had happened and wanted to
make sure that whatever miscalculation had produced this deficit would
not happen again.
Background

The Lincoln Leather Company had been founded by Mr. Lincoln in
the early months of 1955, shortly after his retirement from the United
States Navy. He was in his mid-40’s and had just completed 20 years
of commissioned service. Mr. Lincoln had no previous business experi
ence of any kind. Feeling too young and active to retire and disinclined
to become a company employee, he had decided to invest his savings
and a small inheritance in some form of enterprise. He had been an
enthusiastic amateur photographer for many years and thought seri
ously of involving himself professionally in this field, but ultimately
decided that work as a photographer would be precarious and disrup
tive to his home life. The operation of a processing laboratory was also
considered but was rejected, Mr. Lincoln deciding that he did not
possess the required technical competence.
The wish to be involved in some way with the photographic field
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continued, and Mr. Lincoln began to look for some accessory which
might be produced with a limited outlay. As a result of steadily increas
ing affluence in the United States, amateur photographers were begin
ning to accumulate more sophisticated equipment: flash units, auxiliary
lenses, filters and lens shades and the like. Camera outfit cases, often
called “gadget bags,” capable of holding all the amateur’s equipment,
began to appear on the market. They were expensive, often imported
and frequently of poor design. Mr. Lincoln decided that a ready market
might exist for well-made outfit cases, especially if designed to accom
modate specific popular cameras on a “custom” basis. Relatively little
equipment would be required, primarily cutting devices and heavyduty sewing machines. He decided to enter this field.
The Lincoln Company started operations in March 1955 and sold its
first products one month later. A line of six cases was introduced, made
from high-grade leathers, lined throughout with velours, each model
designed to the exact dimensions of a popular, high-quality camera.
Mr. Lincoln was fortunate to obtain the services of George Mills, a man
in his early forties who had been working as a foreman for a nearby
luggage company and was therefore experienced in leather-working
operations. Product design was undertaken jointly by Mr. Lincoln and
Mr. Mills. A work force of four men and ten women was recruited. Mr.
Mills acted as foreman, inventory controller, production scheduler and
virtually as plant manager. Mr. Lincoln performed all selling and mar
keting functions. Cost studies and pricing were performed by the two
of them on a very informal basis, and a single clerical employee looked
after all correspondence and maintained a simple bookkeeping system
devised by Mr. Lincoln. Initial sales were made to nearby photographic
dealers and to individual buyers through advertisements in the photo
graphic press. Late in 1955, however, Mr. Lincoln succeeded in inter
esting a large photographic discount house with nation-wide sales in
his products. This organization quickly became the Lincoln Company’s
best customer and remained so until the present time.
The company prospered and grew steadily. No serious marketing
problems were encountered. The large discount store usually absorbed
45 per cent to 55 per cent of total production, and most photographic
retailers who had sold the Lincoln cases placed regular repeat orders.
Mr. Lincoln felt that he had little direct competition to face; many
other brands of camera outfit cases were available but most were of
lower quality and price and not “custom tailored.” Little productdesign change was required except for alterations in the internal fasten
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ings and compartments of the cases to conform to changes in the designs
of cameras and accessories for which the cases were produced. By the
end of 1966, the company employed 64 operators and added an addi
tional three persons to the clerical staff. Mr. Mills was now production
superintendent, assisted by one foreman, promoted from the ranks of
the company’s original workers. A five-year summary of production and
income-statement information is provided below as Exhibit 1, as well
as a balance sheet as of December 31, 1966, as Exhibit 2 on page 42.
The New Product Line

Early in 1966 Mr. Lincoln started to consider the possibility of add
ing a new product to the company’s line. Sales volume and revenues
had shown a definite turndown in 1965; the first in the company’s his
tory. Competition in high-class camera cases was becoming increas
ingly intense. One large New York photographic discount house had

EXHIBIT 1
LIN C O LN LEA TH ER COMPANY
Com parative Income Statements
( Figures Rounded to N earest $100)
For the Years Ended Decem ber 31, 1962-1966

Sales (cases)

1966
46,250

Sales
Cost of sales

$1,058,200
698,400

Gross profit
$ 359,800
Selling, general and
adm inistrative
expenses
192,450

42,880

4 1,250

36,780

$935,700
631,300

$957,400
630,800

$822,000
551,700

$723,600
491,200

$304,400

$326,600

$270,300

$232,400

154,100

181,350

140,900

113,250

$ 167,350
150

$150,300
300

$145,250
450

$129,400
600

$119,150
750

Income before taxes $ 167,200
73,800
Provision for taxes

$150,000
65,500

$144,800
63,000

$128,800
55,300

$118,400
50,300

Net income

$ 84,500

$ 81,800

$ 73,500

$ 68,100

$

93,400

1963

1962

1964
43,510

Income before
interest charges
Interest expense

1965
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EXHIBIT 2
LIN C O L N LEA TH ER COMPANY
Balance Sheet
D ecem ber 31, 1966
C urrent Assets:
Cash ......................................................
Accounts receivable ..........................
Inventory .............................................

$ 27,100
148,300
192,500
$367,900

Fixed Assets:
Buildings, plant and equipm ent.......
Less accum ulated d ep reciatio n .......

$617,400
270,100

Total Assets .................................
C urrent Liabilities:
Accounts payable ..............................
Accruals ...............................................
Long-Term D e b t .............................................
Owners’ Equity:
C apital stock .......................................
R etained earnings ...............................

347,300
$715,200

$207,200
14,000

$221,200
3,000

$250,000
241,000

Total Liabilities & Owners’ E quity ...........

491,000
$715,200

started to sell a well-made Japanese line of cases under its own brand
name, at a very competitive price, and was prepared to give a very
substantial discount on this price if the case was ordered at the same
time as a camera or lens. Mr. Lincoln believed that other large photo
graphic suppliers might follow this pattern. One possible strategy for
the Lincoln Company might be to supply cases to these establishments
to sell under their own brand names; however, profit margins in this
type of business were small and would probably come under increasing
pressure from imported goods. Mr. Lincoln felt that his existing prod
ucts offered little scope for cost reduction: The leather cases required
considerable handwork, and automation did not seem feasible at any
thing like the company’s existing volumes. The best solution, therefore,
seemed to be a new and more distinctive product, and, if possible, one
with a lower labor content and greater possibilities for cost reduction.
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After considerable thought, Mr. Lincoln developed the idea of intro
ducing a hard case to supplement the leather camera bags. A line of
aluminum cases with foam-rubber interiors had already been marketed
by another small manufacturer, but these cases, though well-made and
attractive, were relatively expensive, selling for upwards of $45. They
were believed to be bought primarily by professional photographers
and photo-journalists. Mr. Lincoln decided to develop a new hard case
made from moulded fiber glass. Fiber glass luggage and attache cases
had gained rapid and widespread market acceptance, and the material
seemed ideal for a new-style outfit case. Mr. Lincoln believed that such
a case would require much less labor to produce and would provide
more attractive profit margins than the leather cases.
The design of the new cases was undertaken almost entirely by Mr.
Lincoln and Mr. Mills, with some technical assistance from the com
pany which was to supply the required glass fibers, resins and pigments
for the new line. Molds were produced by an outside supplier, using
wooden patterns constructed by Mr. Mills. No attempt was made to set
long-term production schedules for the new cases. Rather, it was de
cided that production of a pilot batch would be undertaken in October
1966, and that the rate at which output was increased thereafter would
be decided on the basis of market acceptance of the line. Mr. Lincoln
and Mr. Wills were uncertain how they should go about pricing the new
cases. After some discussion, they decided to attempt to capitalize on
the distinctive features and novelty value of the cases by setting a price
about 20 per cent higher than the comparable leather lines.
The initial batch of cases was produced in October as scheduled but
proved to be defective. Further attempts were made, but persistent
trouble was encountered in performing the bonding of hinges, fasteners
and metal trim to the fiber glass material. These problems were finally
solved by increasing the thickness of fiber glass and by using rivets to
supplement the bonding process. By the beginning of December, Mr.
Lincoln believed that he had a salable product, and a major part of his
own time during the next few weeks was devoted to visiting the com
pany’s sales outlets to introduce the new cases to them and to obtain
their reactions. Most dealers were enthusiastic but expressed regret
th a t th e cases h a d n o t b ee n av ailab le d u rin g th e p re -C h ristm a s b u y in g

season.
During the early months of 1966, demand for the new cases grew
steadily. Mr. Mills attempted to maintain a small inventory of finished
cases for each popular line of camera. The cases themselves were made
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in two standard sizes, the interior foam rubber lining being cut to ac
commodate specific cameras and various accessories. Small batches of
both standard cases, with the appropriate interiors, were scheduled as
required. Sales volume on a month-by-month basis for the first six
months of 1967 is given in Exhibit 3, below.
Sales of the conventional leather cases, meanwhile, had recovered
from their decline of 1965 to reach a record level in 1966. Sales during
the first half of 1967 revealed a slight decline compared with the same
period 12 months earlier.
The Lincoln Company had adopted a financial year ending on De
cember 31 and Mr. Lincoln had instructed his clerical staff to prepare
an estimated income statement for the six months ending June 30. On
the morning of August 4, 1967, the pro forma statement shown in
Exhibit 4, page 45, was placed on his desk.

The August 4 Meeting

Mr. Lincoln called Mr. Mills into his office immediately after lunch.
Mr. Mills had also received a copy of the pro forma figures. Mr. Lincoln
lost no time in introducing the subject which was causing him anxiety;
he opened the conversation by saying:
Lincoln: George, you’ve had a chance to think about these figures. I’m
very concerned about them. We know that sales of the
leather bags are down a bit from last year, but they are well
above any previous year. The new cases were slow at first,
but they have been picking up very nicely. How do you

EXHIBIT 3
LIN C O L N LEA TH ER COMPANY
M onthly Sales Volume for the Six M onths E nded June 1, 1967

Sales in Units
January ........................... .......................
F e b ru a ry ......................... .......................
M arch .............................. .......................
April ................................ .......................
May .................................. .......................
June .................................. .......................
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80
92
120
138
160
185

Dollar Sales
$2,460
3,125
3,785
4,212
4,890
5,573
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EXHIBIT 4
L IN C O L N LEA TH ER COMPANY
Estim ated Income Statem ent for the Six M onths E nded June 30, 1967
June 30
Estim ated
1967

Actual
1966

S ales.......................................................................
Cost of Sales ......................................................

$493,000
397,000

$486,100
341,600

Gross Profit ..............................................
.....
Selling, G eneral and Admin. Expenses ........

$ 96,000
98,000

$144,500
90,100

Incom e Before Interest ................................... .....
Interest Expense ...............................................

$ (2,000)
—

$ 54,400
75

Income Before Tax .......................................... ......
Provision for Taxes on In c o m e .......................

$ (2,000)
—

$ 54,325
19,565

N et Income ........................................................ .....

$ (2,000)

$ 34,760

account for this loss? Look at that cost of sales! What is
going on here?
Mills:

Well, I thought that our profits were going to be down this
time but I didn’t expect anything like this. The trouble has
to be with the new cases. We are just reaching what I call
real production levels with them and the operators are get
ting used to them. We had a lot of wastage at first but I
think we have that under control. I didn’t realize how much
hand finishing we would have to do on this molded stuff,
but I have three or four people now who really know what
they are doing. I think the year-end figures should be O.K.

Lincoln: Well I certainly hope so, but I want to know just how much
of this cost is due to the new cases. I’m beginning to wonder
if we have bought ourselves a real problem here. Are we
going to be able to make a profit on these things? We didn’t
have much of an idea about what the costs were going to be
when we decided to go ahead with the line. Do we know
what they are even now?
Mills:

We can easily work out the materials cost —in fact, I have
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someone working on it right now. None of the materials we
use on the new line go into the old cases, so it’s just a matter
of extracting them from the purchase file. The labor cost is
another matter, though. When the workers report their time,
they don’t identify which items they have been working on,
and many of them have worked on both lines at different
times. I have a pretty good idea myself now just how much
labor is going into the new cases; it is down to about six hours
a case now, and we should be able to make a profit at that
rate. It could be lower, though, if we could increase the
schedules; I’d like to be able to leave a team on hard cases
all the time instead of making two or three batches a week.
We also lose a lot of time cleaning out the equipment and
then starting up again.
Lincoln: George, it looks as if things are pretty well under control now,
but we need to learn a lesson from all this. We did a lot of
thinking about the product, but I don’t think we got ourselves
half the information we should have had before we decided
to make it. We need to be much more careful before we
introduce any other new product lines. We need to find out
why we have a setback this time, and I think it might be a
pretty good idea to get some outside advice.
Questions:

1. What is the major reason behind the Lincoln Company’s reported
deficit? Give reasons for identifying the particular factor you have
chosen.
2. How could this situation have been avoided? What changes should
be made and / or new procedures introduced before any other new prod
uct is introduced?
3. How should management decide whether or not a proposed new
product is economically justifiable?
Mr. Lincoln Consults His CPA

Two days after the meeting with Mr. Mills, Mr. Lincoln drove into
town and called on the CPA firm which prepared the company’s annual
tax returns. The senior partner in the CPA firm, Mr. Walton Duncan,
had suggested to Mr. Lincoln at the time of the last engagement that
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the Lincoln Company had reached a size at which it was a good idea
to think about introducing more sophisticated control procedures, par
ticularly in the area of costing, cost control and an operating budget.
Mr. Lincoln had promised to think about his suggestion, but had been
satisfied with the company’s operations at that time and had taken no
further action. The present difficulties had reminded him of Mr. Dun
can’s comments, however, and the CPA now seemed to be the obvious
source to turn to for advice and assistance.
On his arrival, Mr. Lincoln was shown into Mr. Duncan’s office. He
explained the reason for his visit and his growing realization that some
kind of improved control procedures were required at Lincoln Leather.
He concluded this explanation by saying:
Lincoln: So there it is, Walt. I’m not particularly concerned about the
new line or the six-month figures; I think things are under
control now, and the loss isn’t disastrous. What worries me
is that we went ahead and made a major decision on a com
bination of hunches, rough estimates and sheer enthusiasm.
There must be a better way of doing things, and I’d like you
to tell me what it is.
Duncan: Well, Roger, I think I could make a fairly accurate appraisal
right now of what the problems are and what we need to set
up for you, but we won’t jump to any conclusions. I’m going
to let Mike Harnet spend a few days with you and take a
thorough look at your setup, and then we’ll get together
again. What I think you need is an information system. That
may sound like an elaborate system, but it certainly doesn’t
have to be anything of the sort. It merely means that we have
to develop procedures to make certain that in the future,
when you have to make a decision, you will have the neces
sary information available. In addition, you should have the
data you need to follow up on your decisions and make sure
that everything is going as planned.
Two days later, Mr. Harnet, one of the firm’s younger CPAs, started
his survey of the Lincoln Company’s procedures. He was welcomed by
Mr. Lincoln who called in Mr. Mills, and the two executives outlined
the systems and methods used by the company and the recent problems.
Mr. Mills then introduced Mr. Harnet to the clerical staff and other key
employees. A desk was provided for Mr. Harnet, and during the next
week he talked to the clerical staff and watched them at work, made
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himself familiar with the clerical procedures and files used by the com
pany, and spent a considerable amount of time with the production
supervisors. Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Mills made themselves available to
him, and he had many discussions with each of them. He talked to
them at length about the way the decision to introduce the new line
had been made and the information upon which the decision had been
based.
One week later, Mr. Harnet believed that he had formed an accurate
picture of the problems at the Lincoln Company. He discussed them
with the senior partner, Mr. Duncan, and decided that an informal
presentation should be made to Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Mills. A meeting
was planned for the following afternoon in Mr. Lincoln’s office.
The Meeting of August 16

The meeting that took place the next day was attended by Mr. Lin
coln, Mr. Mills, Mr. Duncan and Mr. Harnet. Mr. Lincoln introduced
the main topic of the session by saying:
Lincoln: Well, let’s get down to business. I just want to say, Walt, that
George and I don’t claim to know much about accounting or
management systems or whatever you call it these days. So,
whatever you and Mike have found we are doing wrong, and
I’m sure you have found plenty, just let us have it straight.
Duncan: It isn’t so much a question of doing things wrong. Let me
put it this way. When you start a business on a very small
scale, it can be a pretty informal affair: You have a one-man
management who makes all the decisions, carries all the im
portant information in his head and can keep in touch with
everything going on in the organization. Now, let’s suppose
the business prospers and gets larger. It could realistically
outgrow its original building, which may have been just a
garage. It also outgrows its original informal methods of
management. When that happens, you need to introduce a
set of systems and procedures for handling information and
for using that information to make decisions and keep in
touch with things. The system can still be pretty simple at
this stage, but it is well worth giving some thought to setting
up something which is basically sound and will be able to
expand with the company. We think that the Lincoln Com
pany has reached this stage. It just isn’t possible for you and
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George to run a company with sales of over a million dollars
as you ran it when you were taking in a few hundred thou
sand. Problems of growth can be eliminated by introducing
a few simple procedures.
Lincoln: Fine. But I feel that one reason we have made good profits
until this year is that we have kept our clerical staff to a mini
mum. You will recall that in the past you recommended that
we hire a more qualified accounting staff and prepare our
selves for opinion audits. Well, so far we haven’t felt the
need. It will be pretty hard to talk me into anything that
involves a lot more office workers.
Duncan: Roger, the way you are growing, you may one day look for
outside financing. Isn’t it better to prepare for that event now
rather than get hit all at once? In any event, for this engage
ment I doubt whether you would need more than a few extra
clerical people at the most, but Mike will explain more about
that. First, I’d like him to give you a summary of his findings
and an outline of what we are suggesting.
Harnet:

Let’s talk about the introduction of the new line, because I
think it illustrates all the areas in which we need to think
about the information system. And I should like to identify
four areas of primary importance: sales forecasting, break
even analysis, costing and cost control.
The management information system is not a simple one
way flow system. Information produced in one area is used
in a number of other areas, and there is a lot of feedback and
many interrelationships. But the most important piece of
information in the whole system is the sales forecast, because
it forms the basis of almost everything else: profit plan, manu
facturing plan, cash budget, variable costs, purchasing plan
and inventory levels and batch sizes. So, it is hard to exag
gerate the importance of a sound, realistic sales forecast.
Now, no one is going to be able to make a forecast that is
completely accurate. You can’t say with certainty that you
will sell exactly 45,274 cases this year, for instance. But you
may have a good idea that you will sell “about” 45,000, or
“somewhere between 43,000 and 47,000” perhaps. A good
estimate is essential, and an estimate of a range within which
you expect sales to fall is even better. Better yet, you should
go one step further and try to make some kind of probability
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assessment of the chance that sales will or will not be within
the specified range.
As far as I have been able to understand it, you decided to
produce your new product line without a specific sales fore
cast of any kind. You designed a product and asked yourself
“will it sell?” and the answer was yes. But you didn’t ask
yourselves how many it would sell, how wrong your estimate
could be, or how long it would take to reach the volume you
predicted. I’m sure you had a volume in mind, but I suspect
you didn’t allow for the time needed to reach a reasonable
volume, the high cost per unit associated with a low volume,
the inexperience of the operators with the line, and the small
batch sizes.
That brings me to the next matter, costs. You need to know
what the direct costs involved in producing the line are likely
to be before you can decide its price or do a meaningful
breakeven analysis to see if the line is worth producing. The
sales forecast is used here as well. Your approach to the pric
ing of this line was based on the product itself, and you
decided what premium people would be willing to pay for
such a case compared with the conventional soft bags. Well,
you know the trade and I’m sure the line is priced just about
right —but you didn’t really know whether you could make
a reasonable profit on it at that price. In fact, you embarked
on a technology which was quite new to you, with only a very
rough idea about what the costs were likely to be. You will
probably say that there was no way of getting that informa
tion except by going ahead and trying it for yourselves. This
may be true, but in such a case it would be good to compile
a “sensitivity analysis,” making various assumptions about
sales volume and calculating at each set of assumptions how
profitable the line would be and what variable cost figure is
the maximum which would let you break even. Let me show
you what I mean. Just to keep things simple, assume that you
have only one model in the new line, that the highest price
you can hope to sell it at is $30 and that the fixed costs asso
ciated with producing it are $5,000 per month. You are not
sure what the variable costs are going to be, but you think
they will be around $12. You can now easily do a breakeven
analysis that looks like this: (Mr. Harnet’s sketch is repro
duced as Figure 1, page 51.)
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Figure 1

Sales in Units

You can see immediately that the breakeven volume under
this particular cost assumption is around 275 units a month;
it actually works out to 278. So at anything over 278 units a
month, you can expect to make a profit. But if your variable
cost estimate of $12 a unit is wrong, this breakeven figure isn’t
going to mean very much. It might well be true that you
have better information and can make a better judgment
about sales volume than you can about variable costs. In this
case, you might want to assume that sales are unlikely to be
above 250 units a month, for example, and ask what is the
highest variable cost that will still let you break even. You
can do this by setting up a simple formula, letting X = vari
able cost:
At breakeven, 30 X 250 = 5,000 + 250 X
7,500
= 5 ,0 0 0 + 2 5 0 X
250 X
= 2,500
X
=10
That is, at your “most likely” sales estimate, you will not
break even unless the variable cost per unit can be kept down
to $10 or less. W ith this information, you are in a much
stronger position to decide whether or not to go ahead with
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the new line. If you do decide to put the line into production,
you now have two vital pieces of information which can form
the basis of your control of operations: You know that to in
sure profitable operations you must achieve a certain sales/
production target and control costs below a certain limit.
This brings us to the other area in which adequate infor
mation is vital, the control of operations. You introduced the
case line without knowing what the costs would be. Though
I recognize they were hard to determine at that time, I have
tried to indicate that you could have developed some idea of
permissible cost levels. But you have now had the line in
production more than six months, and you still do not know
what the labor cost of the line is. W hat we need are: first,
target figures for sales and variable costs that will allow a
reasonable profit margin; and second, a data recording
system that will tell you whether or not targets are being
achieved or at least let you know if they are not being
achieved. Once we have these, we have the basis of a good
information system. The other figure needed is a cash budget
to synthesize all the information and to make sure that our
operations do not lead to insolvency.
Lincoln: I like your ideas but we need help in establishing the system.
You have mentioned all the areas that need improvement.
Mills:
We do need to know more about costs. However, I’m not
convinced about your “production plan.” I see the need for
a sales target, but I need flexibility in using it for production
orders. But you have some ideas there that we can certainly
use.
Lincoln: Walt, you fellows certainly put a finger on our problems.
However, we don’t have the time or staff to implement your
suggestions. Where do we go from here?
Duncan: I recommend that first of all, you hire a controller. You should
have someone who will be trained in the system and who
could make the necessary adjustments to the system as busi
ness events warrant the change. Once you do that, we will
schedule Mike Harnet to work with him.
Lincoln: I can agree with you that we should have someone here to
monitor the system, but a controller will add a pretty steep
cost for an information system.
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Duncan: That’s not really true, Roger, because you will need additional
clerks anyway. If you follow my recommendation, you will
have someone who can pick up the rest of the work that
needs to be done in the internal control and accounting sys
tem area and also begin preparing for annual audits. I would
expect that a controller for your needs would cost about
$18,000. In the first year, he may spend about half his time
on the information system. The first year cost therefore
should be: $9,000 for the controller, and $3,500 for our time.
However, the benefits should compensate for much of that
cost.
As in all these kinds of engagements, Roger, we will send
you an engagement letter and proposal. If you agree with
what we set forth, we will develop the system.
Conclusion

Mr. Lincoln did hire a controller and invited the CPA firm to help
him design and install the systems they considered necessary. Mr.
Harnet spent a considerable amount of time in the Lincoln Company
during subsequent weeks. His first action was to design and introduce
modified material usage tickets and time sheets through which materials
and labor costs could be identified and related to the particular line
and model on which they had been used. Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Mills
decided, after considerable thought, that a realistic sales target for the
latter half of 1967 would be 3,500 old-style and 260 new-style cases per
month. Tentative labor and materials cost targets were established on
the basis of these figures. At the time of writing (November 1967)
sales of the new cases are running ahead of target, and a sales budget
of 350 new-style and 3,200 old-style cases per month had been estab
lished for the first six months of 1968. Mr. Mills continues to schedule
production batches and model runs “by ear,” but the existence of an
overall monthly budget target has encouraged him to use larger batch
quantities with consequent savings in production costs. Operations in
the second half of 1967 were profitable, and a small profit was reported
for the full year’s operations. The new system proved its value in Octo
ber 1967 when a sudden and definite increase in the labor cost of the
new-style cases was reported. Inquiry revealed that a new adhesive
used in the bonding of the internal rubber case lining to the outer shell
was defective and needed considerable rework. Under the old system,
this problem might have persisted for some weeks before its seriousness
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was realized. A simple cash budget has been established and is revised
each month by the controller on the basis of actual sales recorded in
the month.
The system which has been introduced in the Lincoln Company is
essentially a simple one, and has required only one addition to the
clerical staff plus the controller. A cost clerk has been appointed with
responsibility for identifying and compiling costs for each line at the
end of every week, comparing them with the target figures established
in the cost budget, and reporting any significant variances. The daily
production figures are collected by the shop foreman and passed to the
controller and to Mr. Mills who compares them with the monthly tar
get, making any necessary revisions in his schedules for the rest of the
month. The controller maintains the cash budget, and attention is now
being given to the possibility of a more systematic control of informa
tion about supplier performance and its significance for inventory levels.
The controller has also improved the accounting system to the point
where management now wishes to have an annual audit as well.
No new product line has been added since the system was introduced.
But Mr. Lincoln is considering the extension of the hard-case line in the
near future. He has discussed the proposal with Mr. Harnet and is well
aware of the importance of a realistic estimate of the potential market
for the cases. He feels that the cost information now available to him
makes the decision a much less hazardous matter than was the previous
new model introduction.
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Neptune Pump Company
On April 5, 1967, Mr. Miles Richland, chief financial executive of
the Neptune Pump Company, was concerned about the company’s
cash management procedures. On April 4 he had been informed by the
company cashier that the balance in the demand deposit accounts
maintained with two local commercial banks had fallen to a combined
total of $27,000. This was considerably below the company’s estimate
of a “safe minimum” level and would only be adequate to meet the
forecasted cash requirements of the next two months. The Neptune
Pump Company did not maintain savings deposit accounts and had no
other liquid assets. Any threat of cash deficiency was obviously a
serious matter and demanded immediate action.
On April 17 Mr. Richland believed that the crisis was past. His first
actions on hearing of the threatened cash shortage had been to ap
proach the company’s banks, and after prolonged negotiations he had
been able to arrange a $100,000 line of credit with one of the banks.
But the experience had not been an enjoyable one. Mr. Richland did
not like having to negotiate from a position of weakness, and the banks
made it clear that their faith in the company’s financial management
had been shaken. The rate of interest on borrowing under the line of
credit was set at one per cent above the bank’s prime rate; previously
the Neptune Company had never been asked to pay more than onehalf of one per cent above the prime rate. The bank had made it clear
that they expected the borrowing to be liquidated or replaced by more
permanent financing within six months. Mr. Richland hoped that this
could be accomplished, but was disturbed that the need for such
emergency borrowing had arisen at all.
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Background

The Neptune Pump Company was a small manufacturing company
located in an industrial center in the State of Ohio, and had been
founded in the early 1920’s. The original products had been small
piston-type pumps, often hand operated, that were sold primarily to
agricultural users. Over many years the product line had been extended,
and in 1967 it included piston and centrifugal pumps of many types,
submersible electric pumps for use in wells, air and gas compressors
used in paint spraying equipment and commercial refrigeration units,
and small, portable fire pumps. All production and assembly was con
centrated in one plant, which had been enlarged and modernized in
the early 1960’s.
In 1966 the company’s sales had reached their highest total of
$4,200,000 and 1967 first quarter figures indicated that 1967 sales would
set a new record, reaching the company’s 1967 sales target of $4,500,000.
The company’s income statements are reproduced in Exhibit 1, on page
57, and the company’s balance sheet as of December 30, 1966, is Ex
hibit 2 on page 58.
Mr. Richland’s anxiety about the threatened cash shortage in April
1967 was greatly intensified by the fact that he had spent considerable
time introducing systems which should have made such an occurrence
impossible. Since his appointment to his present post in 1964, he had
designed and installed a comprehensive budgetary control system. This
system included a 12-month sales budget setting monthly sales targets
which in turn provided the basis for the production plan, labor budget,
purchasing budget, and production-scheduling and inventory-control
activities. A long-range sales estimate for a five-year period was also
made, and this served as the basis for the capital-investment program.
Finally, information from the various budgets and operating activi
ties was brought together in the company cash-flow forecast which
indicated the overall changes expected in company cash levels. This
cash-flow forecast was made on a monthly basis, but it was Mr.
Richland's practice to make weekly forecasts for any month in which
cash levels were expected to fall below “safe levels,” the safe level
being determined as $50,000. The cash-flow forecast for 1967 ( Exhibit
3) indicated that cash balances had been expected to remain above this
“safe level” throughout 1967. ( See Exhibit 3, page 59).
The control system used in the company included three sets of vari
ance reports, based on the sales, purchasing and labor budgets. Actual
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performance in each of these areas was compared with budget target
figures each month and any significant variances were reported to the
controller’s department and to the appropriate line or staff executive.
The budget and variance system was further refined by provision of
both price and volume targets in the manufacturing budgets, and both
price and volume variances for labor and materials were calculated
and reported.
The first indication that something was wrong had come to Mr.
Richland at the end of March, when he received a report that the
EXHIBIT 1
N EPTU N E PUM P COMPANY
Five-Year Income Summary
For the Years E nded D ecem ber 31, 1962-1966
(000 om itted)
1966

1965

15,100

14,350 13,670

12,240 13,120

N et Sales ............................................. $4,215
Service & S p a re s .................................
522

$3,685 $3,415
503
714

$3,074 $3,244
542
481

Total Revenue .......................... $4,737

$4,188 $4,129

$3,616 $3,725

Cost of Goods S o ld :
D irect M a te ria ls........................ $1,180
D irect L abor ............................ 1,355
Plant O verhead ........................ 1,014

$ 936 $ 845
1,214
1,236
911
927

$ 672 $ 683
1,051 1,160
790
870

T otal ................................... $3,549

$3,061 $3,008

$2,513 $2,713

Gross M argin ..................................... $1,188

$1,127

$1,121

$1,103 $1,012

Selling & A dm inistration ................ $

725

$ 670

$ 682

$ 690

$ 584

T o t a l ..................................... $
In te r e s t..................................................

463
10

$ 457
10

$ 439
12

$ 413
12

$ 428
15

N et Incom e Before Tax .................. $ 453
Federal Income Tax ........................
211

$ 447
207

$ 427
198

$ 401
186

$ 413
192

N et Incom e ......................................... $

242

$ 240

$ 229

$ 215

$ 221

D ividends Paid ................................. $

80

$

Units Sold:

Transferred to R etained E a rn in g s.. $ 162

80

$ 160

1964

$

75

$ 154

1963

$

75

$ 140

1962

$

70

$ 151
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EXHIBIT 2

N EPTU N E PUM P COMPANY
BALANCE SH EET
D ecem ber 31, 1966

ASSETS
Cash .......................................................... $ 210,600
Accounts Receivable ............................
445,000
Inventories ................................................
232,300
Total ..........................................................
L and & Buildings ................................... $ 720,000
P lant & E q u ip m e n t................................. 1,572,500
Less A ccum ulated D epreciation .......

$ 887,900

$2,292,500
462,700

N et Fixed A s s e ts .....................................

1,829,800

Total Assets .............................................

$2,717,700

L IA B ILITIES AND CAPITALIZATION
Accounts Payable .................................. $ 284,500
78,400
Accruals ...................................................
T otal .........................................................

$ 362,900

Long-Term Liabilities .........................

250,000

Total Liabilities ....................................

$ 612,900

C apital S to c k .......................................... $ 775,000
R etained Earnings ................................ 1,329,800
Total Stockholders’ E quity .................

2,104,800

Total Liabilities and C apitalization ...

$2,717,700

company’s cash balance had fallen to $87,000. This was comfortably
in excess of the $50,000 “minimum safe balance” level, but was con
siderably below the figure of $146,000 that was projected for this
cash-flow forecast. During the first two weeks of April, Mr. Richland’s
staff examined all departmental budget variance reports submitted
during the previous month and checked with the originating depart
ments to insure that all variances had indeed been reported. Their
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COMPANY

A
400

$385 $360 $360

$156

$136

$156 $176

$236 $281

$330

$370 $390

$236 $286 $146

$410

Cash at end of the month .....................

$375 $400 $420 $430

O
N
D
365 360 350

$236 $281 $330 $370
$ 50 $ 50 $ 45 $ 45
360 335 315 315

S
380

$115 $115 $115 $125 $125 $140 $140 $130 $125 $120 $120 $120
90
85
90
95
95 105
110
100
95
90
90
85
60
65
70
70
75
80 100
90
85
70
70
70
—
—
170
30
100
—
30
50
—
36
40
—
—
—
—
—
5
—
—
—
—
—
5
—
—
40
—
—
50
—
—
60
—
—
60
20
—
—
20
—
—
20
—
—
20 —
$285 $265 $485 $340 $395 $380 $400 $370 $365 $336 $320 $340

$345 $350

$315

J
440

$310

J
420

Wages and salaries ................................
Purchases.................................................
Other cash expenses.................................
Capital investments .................................
Interest payments....................................
Tax payments ..........................................
Dividends ...............................................
Total outflow .............................

Total inflow...............................

M
390

$236 $286 $146 $156 $136 $156 $176
$ 40 $45 $ 45 $ 50 $ 60 $ 65 $ 5 5
275
300 305 325 340 355
375

A
370

$211
$ 40
270

M
350

Cash at beginning of the month ............
Cash sales ...............................................
Receipts from credit sales .....................

F
345

J
320

Sales .........................................................

Cash-Flow Forecast for 1967
(000 omitted)

NEPTUNE PUMP

EXHIBIT 3

NEPTUNE PUMP COMPANY
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inquiries did not produce any information leading to an adequate
explanation of the low cash balances. Sales during March and the two
previous months were slightly ahead of the sales targets, and production
plans for May were being revised upwards in consequence. The labor
budget indicated that labor costs were very close to planned levels,
with no significant variance in either efficiency (number of labor hours)
or wage rate (average hourly rate paid). The materials purchasing
budget showed no price variance. There was, however, a volume vari
ance indicating that purchases of some parts and materials were in
excess of planned figures. The variance was not large. The excess
purchases were primarily of components and sub-assemblies, which
made up 30 per cent by dollar value of total company purchases, and
showed an average increase of approximately 15 per cent.
Mr. Richland had been considering what to do next when the news
of the impending cash shortage at the end of March reached him. The
cash-flow forecast indicated that cash outflows were expected to exceed
inflows by $20,000 during May, and the matter was thus one of great
urgency. A temporary solution was found by negotiating the short-term
line of credit mentioned earlier. In the third week of April, however,
Mr. Richland set about the task of determining just what was happening
and of finding a solution to the company’s cash-management problem.
Questions

1. What explanation can you offer for the Neptune Company’s cash
shortage? Why has cash fallen below the level predicted in the cash
flow forecast ( Exhibit 3) ?
2. Where should Mr. Richland direct his inquiries? If you were
asked to assist him, where would you start?
Mr. Richland Talks to Mr. Stanton

During his three years as chief financial executive of the Neptune
Company, Mr. Richland had developed an excellent relationship with
Mr. Joel Stanton, a principal in the CPA firm of Stanton, Chub and
Glauber. Mr. Richland knew that this firm had built up a reputation
for management services activities and that Mr. Stanton was particu
larly interested in this area. He decided to invite the CPA to call on
him and to see if he could offer any help in the cash-management
problem.
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The initial meeting between Mr. Stanton and Mr. Richland was held
on April 24. Mr. Richland related the relevant information to Mr.
Stanton and described the company’s control and reporting system.
Mr. Stanton asked a number of questions and spent some time looking
over a summary of variance reports made during the past three months.
He then suggested an approach to the problem that has been sum
marized in the following quotation:
Stanton:

You seem to have a basically sound, well-designed bud
getary control system, but you might consider whether it
is sufficiently comprehensive. The areas covered by the
system certainly do not explain the current cash position.
That purchasing volume variance needs looking into, but
it doesn’t account for a difference of $119,000 between the
forecast and actual cash positions. I think we are going to
find that the answer is in something external to the bud
getary system. The operations of any company are closely
dependent on each other and, if they are to function in
harmony, there must be mutual interchange of information
that goes far beyond the budgetary control system. I think
we have a breakdown in communications somewhere in
this wider information system, and we should find out where
that breakdown is.
Miles, this is what I think we should do. As you know,
those external causes are in functional areas not under your
immediate control, and in order to root out this problem we
will have to cross functional lines.
Based on what I see here, I had better talk with Bill
Holster (president of the Neptune Pump Company) and
get his support.

Richland: That certainly makes sense to me. Bill will want to have
some indication of what you will be charging us anyway.
Knowing that he is management minded, I’m sure you will
be back soon.
Mr. Stanton briefly spoke with Bill that day. As agreed, Mr. Stanton
submitted a proposal a few days later. The proposal is reproduced in
Exhibit 4, page 62.
Mr. Holster agreed with the proposal. Shortly after, the project team
began to identify the cause of the current problem and see what modi
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fications might be required in the company’s procedures. During the
following weeks a thorough investigation was carried out. Particular
attention was paid to the purchasing activity. The key to the increased
purchasing-volume variance, however, was revealed when Mr. Stanton
talked to Mr. Graham Bannister, production control manager, whose
responsibilities included inventory planning and control.
When asked why the production control activity had been placing
an increased volume of orders for parts and sub-assemblies with the

Exhibit 4
Stanton, C hub and G lauber
Certified Public Accountants
277 N orth M ain Street
Dayton, Ohio
D ear Mr. Holster:
W e subm it the following proposal relating to a m anagem ent services
engagem ent dealing w ith your inform ation system.
The objectives of this engagem ent are to determ ine your reporting
requirem ents and the installation of a system th at will m eet those require
ments. It is understood th at the last phase will be undertaken only after
your approval of the recom m ended system. The benefits of this engage
m ent can be identified w ith better inform ation reporting and should result
in the im provem ent of your operations.
W e propose to m eet w ith all functional heads of the N eptune Pum p
Com pany to determ ine their inform ational needs, and develop the necessary
forms to gather th at inform ation and to develop a suggested inform ational
system. At th at stage we expect to m eet w ith you and your m anagem ent
team to discuss our recommendations.
W e expect to utilize Mr. Richland and selected mem bers of his staff. You
will therefore receive an additional benefit in th at your staff will be trained
in the system and can adjust th at system as the need arises.
I anticipate th at our firm will devote approxim ately 60 m an-days to this
engagem ent, at an approxim ate cost of $10,000. W e expect to bill for this
engagem ent in two parts. The first billing will be m ade at the conference
called for above w ith the last bill to be subm itted at the conclusion of
the engagem ent.
If you concur w ith this proposal, please sign the carbon copy and return
it to this office in the envelope supplied.
Very truly yours,
Joel M. Stanton
Stanton, C hub and G lauber
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purchasing department, Mr. Bannister replied: “Partly in anticipation
of higher production schedules: I know that sales are running ahead
of targets and, in these circumstances, I would expect the production
plan to be accelerated sometime in the year. I don’t want to be short
of parts if that happens. There is another reason, though. Once or
twice recently we have had emergencies when an outside supplier
failed to produce parts when we needed them. We avoided work
stoppages only by panic action: taking parts away from the service
department, sending a car to the suppliers’ plants, and so on. That isn’t
the way I like to run my department.
“I am a bit suspicious about the purchasing department’s screening
of suppliers and their estimates and assurances on lead times. So, if
the purchasing boys tell me that the lead time on a part is three weeks,
I now tend to call it four weeks and recalculate my buffer stock on that
assumption.”
Mr. Stanton pointed out the consequences of Mr. Bannister’s be
havior. Most parts were controlled on the “Fixed Order Quantity”
system, and the procedure included an element of “safety stock” in that
the quantity in the buffer was designed to cover the maximum foresee
able demand during the lead time. Thus, if lead time for a particular
part was three weeks, and normal usage was 150 units a week, with
the highest foreseeable rate of usage being 33 per cent above normal,
then the buffer stock in this case would be determined as follows:
Buffer stock = 3 X (4/3 X 150) = 600 units
Average inventory in this case would be the buffer level plus half the
order quantity. If the order quantity was, say, 2,000 units, then
average inventory = buffer + Q /2
= 600 + 2000/2
= 1,600 units.
The effect of Mr. Bannister’s adjustment of lead times may easily
be calculated. Increasing lead time to four weeks, the buffer becomes
4 X (4/3 X 150) = 800 units and average inventory becomes 800 +
2000/2 = 1,800 units.
This factor provided the explanation for the adverse purchasingvolume variance, and Mr. Stanton estimated that over the past two
months the growth in average inventories had necessitated an increase
in working capital of approximately $22,000, thus reducing available
cash by that amount. The cause of the balance of the cash drain,
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approximately $100,000, had still to be identified, however.
After further analysis, Mr. Stanton decided that a sum of this magni
tude could be explained only by a change in the pattern of receipts
from sales. A conversation with the industrial sales manager, Mr. Karl
Schultz, confirmed that his deduction was correct.
Mr. Schultz told Mr. Stanton: “We were forced to make a change in
credit policy a couple of months ago. In the past we have always used
terms of ‘2 per cent discount for ten-day payment, 30 days net’ in the
industrial area; in the agricultural market we have to be more generous.
Well, we have been getting increasing competition in our main market
area from the pump division of the Universal Foundry & Machine
Corp. We have a better product than they do and we can tailor our
specifications to the customer’s needs more easily, but they have been
fighting us in the area of credit terms. Also, they have made use of the
financial strength of their parent organization to set up a very attractive
conditional purchase contract scheme for some of the more expensive
items. We can’t match that. What we have done is to start giving
longer credit terms, if it seems the only way to make sure we get the
sale. We haven’t publicized this at all, but we have extended these
terms to quite a few of our larger industrial customers. The terms have
typically been ‘net 60 days,’ but we have gone to 90 days in a couple
of cases.”
Mr. Stanton realized that a change in credit policy of this magnitude
was quite sufficient to explain the company’s cash shortage. Industrial
sales represented 60 per cent of total company revenue, approximately
$180,000 per month at the present time. A change in policy from 30
to 60 days credit, made effective in February, would mean that a
significant portion of the $180,000 industrial sales receipts expected in
March would not, in fact, be received until late in April. In effect, the
company’s working-capital needs had been increased by the amount on
which the longer terms had been granted. Mr. Stanton asked Mr.
Richland to have an estimated balance sheet prepared as of May 1, and
the result confirmed his diagnosis. Accounts receivable had increased
to $538,200, almost $95,000 more than at the previous December 31
balance. At the current rate of sales of approximately $350,000 per
month, this represented a collection period of:
[538 ÷ (350 X 12)] X 365 = .128 X 365 = 47 days average collection
The estimated balance sheet, reproduced on page 65 as Exhibit 5, also
indicated that inventory had increased by $20,300.
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EXHIBIT 5

N EPTU N E PUM P COMPANY
Estim ated Balance Sheet
M ay 1, 1967
ASSETS
Cash .......................................................... $ 24,000
Accounts Receivable ............................
538,200
Inventories ...............................................
252,600
Total ..................................................

$ 814,800

L and & Buildings ................................... $ 720,000
Plant & E q u ip m e n t................................. 1,782,500
Total .................................................. $2,502,500
Accum ulated D epreciation ................ $ 462,700
N et Book V a lu e ...............................

2,039,800

Total Assets .....................................

$2,854,600

LIA BILITIES AND CAPITAL
Accounts Payable ................................... $ 305,100
Accruals ....................................................
75,000
Bank Loan ...............................................
78,400
Total ..................................................
Long-Term D ebt ...................................
C apital Stock ......................................... $ 775,000
R etained Earnings ................................. 1,371,100

$ 458,500
250,000

Total Shareholders’ E quity .......

2,146,100

Total Liabilities & Capitalization

$2,854,600

Summary and Conclusion

The cash deficiency crisis in the Neptune Company arose because of
failures in communication. These events convinced Mr. Richland that
an overall management information system, considerably more com
prehensive than the existing planning and budgetary system, had to be
developed if such crises were to be avoided in the future.
In developing the company’s information system, the budget system
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was extended to include a cash budget which establishes monthly
targets and reports variances from those targets, rather than a simple
cash-flow forecast. The manufacturing budgets had been improved
by the introduction of variable labor and material cost figures for dif
ferent levels of output, and steps were taken to improve the integration
of production scheduling, inventory-decision rules and capital expendi
ture programs with the sales and production plans.
The management of the Neptune Pump Company realized that their
most important task was an educational one. In a dynamic, changing
organization, no system of procedures, nor even a completely central
ized data handling activity, can insure that all available relevant
information is available to all decision makers at all times. An efficient
information system is achieved only when the management team
realizes the importance of communications and is aware of the extent
to which events and decisions in their own areas may influence the
performance of other company activities. Mr. Richland is now con
vinced that many managers whose careers have been confined to a
single specialization are not aware of these wider implications of many
of their actions. A series of company seminars was organized to help
these executives think in broader terms and to see problems from a
"company” rather than departmental level. Mr. Holster believes that
this educational program resulted in greater improvement to the
“informal” content of the company’s information system and will, as
an added bonus, produce men who are better qualified to assume top
management positions when the opportunity arises.
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Modern Wear, Inc.
In May 1967, Modem Wear, Inc., of Elizabeth, New Jersey, a small
manufacturing company producing children’s clothing for sale to large
retail stores, had almost finished production of its summer lines. The
founder, president, and chief executive of the company, Mr. Robert
Ogden, was trying to decide upon his production plans for the fall
season models which would go into production in the early part of June.
The number of factors which had to be taken into account seemed
formidable, and Mr. Ogden was not sure how he could resolve the
situation to produce an optimum product mix.
Background

Modem Wear, Inc., had been founded by Mr. Ogden in May of
1948 shortly after he left a management position with Formidable
Wear, Inc. The company was small, with sales of less than $300,000 in
1966, but had made a profit in every year except 1953. Operating from
a three-story brick building in the industrial part of the town, the com
pany produced a limited range of low-priced, hard-wearing cotton
slacks for young children.
The fall fine produced in each of the past three years had included
three basic models: the top-of-the-line model, the Dapper, which was
described as dress slacks; a line of rugged play trousers in denim mate
rials called the Digger; and an easily washable drip-dry line known as
the Diver. All were produced in boys’ sizes for ages five to 12.
The Company’s products had a regional distribution, selling primarily
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to department and major clothing stores in New Jersey and in New
York City. Sales were made in lots of 100 garments or in half lots of 50.
Some garments were also sold to jobbers who bought lots and then
resold them in smaller quantities to small retail outlets. All garments
were sold under the Modern Wear label. In 1964 a major mail order
house had offered to purchase regular quantities of garments to be sold
under the house’s own brand name, but Mr. Ogden believed that under
such a system he might become dangerously dependent upon a single
customer, and he therefore declined the offer.
Most of the company’s production equipment had been replaced in
recent years, and had an average age of about seven years and approxi
mate life expectancy of 12 years. The equipment was mostly of two
types —fabric cutting machines which could duplicate a pre-set pattern
and required a skilled operator, and stitching machines which required
only semi-skilled labor. The latter were, in effect, simply heavy-duty
sewing machines. Most of the company’s operators were paid on a
piecework basis. The workers were primarily drawn from the low
income area of Elizabeth, and included many recent immigrants. This
potential labor supply was almost entirely unskilled, and labor turnover
was high. Persistent labor problems had led Mr. Ogden to consider
moving his business elsewhere, perhaps to the Appalachian region of
Tennessee. So far, he had made no decision to do so. This uncertainty,
however, had discouraged him from making any recent increases in
productive capacity even though demand for the company’s products
was at an all-time high.
The company’s production plans were entirely on a seasonal basis,
with a lead time of three to four months; thus, winter production was
devoted to spring lines, spring production consisted of summer clothing,
and so forth. Orders usually began to arrive about six months in
advance of the start of the season, and reached a peak eight to ten
weeks before the season opened. In May 1967, the summer-line pro
duction plans had been completed, and finished-goods inventories of
these items were running low. Delivery of fall-line goods would have
to begin during the first week in August. The seasonal production cycle
was normally of ten weeks’ duration, and production of these lines
would have to start by June 1. Mr. Ogden was worried about the
coming season’s production for a number of reasons. The fall season
was usually the company’s most profitable, largely because of “back to
school” purchases, often accounting for 40 per cent of total annual sales.
Demand for the company’s products in the coming fall season seemed
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fairly certain to be much greater than supply. The problems facing Mr.
Ogden were primarily internal ones. The scarcity of skilled labor was
a continuing problem. The availability of machine time would certainly
be a limiting factor, especially because no additional equipment had
been purchased during the past two years. Finally, and even more
serious, the company’s operations were being constrained by a shortage
of cash. Despite profitable operations, the company’s cash balance had
been drawn down because of a recent debt maturity and because many
of Modem Wear’s customers had been slow in settling their accounts.
Mr. Ogden was not certain that the available cash would be adequate
to purchase all the materials required for the fall production runs. He
had decided to look into the possibility of obtaining short-term funds
from the company’s bank, and was wondering how best to present his
request to the bank officials. Mr. Ogden decided that he would seek
the advice and assistance, both about the financial position and about
his overall planning problem, from his “auditors” as he had done in
the past.
First Meeting with Mr. Murphy

Fellin & Murphy was a respected, small CPA firm with offices in
downtown Newark. Mr. Ogden visited Mr. Murphy in his offices on
May 17. After some exchange of news about their respective families,
Mr. Ogden explained the need to reach a decision about the fall-line
production program and the factors constraining his decision, and
finished up by remarking:
Ogden:

I guess my business is really going pretty well. Last year was
a good year and we have had a reasonable summer despite
some headaches. As orders are coming in now I know that
I can sell just about anything I produce this fall. The problem
is, how do I produce it and where do I find the cash?
Murphy: Bob, you may be in danger of confusing two separate prob
lems. The main one seems to be deciding the most profitable
mix to produce. I suspect that your approach to this problem
is on the basis of what you feel the demand may be. The
second problem is to raise some additional cash. That should
not be too difficult, and we’ll turn to it later.
Ogden: That’s probably right. W hat about this product-mix prob
lem? Is there some logical way of getting at an optimum
mix? I certainly don’t know one. You know that different
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models’ lines require different amounts of cutting and sewing
time. Further, different materials have different prices.
Therefore, one mix ties up more working capital than an
other —there are just so many possible combinations that I
don’t see any way of working them all out.
Murphy: There is a technique that is designed to solve just this kind
of problem. It is called linear programing. It’s a straight
forward mathematical technique that consolidates informa
tion about the relevant activities in the company that play a
part in the decision, not only information about profit per unit
and costs, but also the potentially limiting factors. These in
clude shortage of machine time, labor, and working capital. If
you can provide reasonably accurate information about these
matters, we can express them in terms of equations and solve
the equations to find our optimum product mix. The various
models in your product range are, in effect, competing for
scarce resources: money, machine time and labor. The prob
lem is one of allocating these resources in a way that produces
the maximum profit. Problems of this kind are certainly
complex, and it’s hardly surprising that you were not able
to work out an optimum solution. The linear programing
technique can’t produce an answer in one step straight from
the formulation of the problem. What it can do is produce a
possible answer and see if it is the optimum. If it is not, it’s
possible to change the least optimal part of it until a solution
is achieved by a series of systematic steps. So in a sense it
is a trial-and-error approach, but certainly not a hit-or-miss
one. I think we might find it useful here if you can provide
all the relevant information.
It was decided that Mr. Murphy should visit Modem Wear’s offices
the next day so that work could be started on gathering the required
information and arranging it in the form necessary for a linear pro
graming solution.
Formulating Modern Wear’s Problem

On May 18, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Ogden, Janis Dawson, the company’s
bookkeeper, and Sam Pringle, the production supervisor, met in Mr.
Ogden’s office.
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The Profit Function
Mr. Murphy explained that the first requirement was a criterion
function, a factor to be maximized or minimized according to the prob
lem. In this case the purpose of the analysis was to maximize profit.
To do this, it was necessary to know how much contribution to total
profit was provided by the sale of one item of each line. Mr. Murphy
stressed the importance of a direct-cost approach here. Fixed costs,
which would have to be paid regardless of the product mix or level of
output, were not relevant to the problem. The required figure was
each line’s contribution to total profit —or contribution to overhead,
since maximization of contribution to the coverage of fixed costs will
automatically maximize profit. The group set about assembling the
necessary information on this basis and eventually produced the data
given in Exhibit 1, below.
All such items as rent, heating and lighting and managerial salaries
were excluded. Depreciation as normally calculated on a time basis
was also excluded, but a machine time charge was included because
additional running time increases deterioration of the machinery and
the overhaul requirement, and this cost should be apportioned to the
various lines in proportion to their machine-time requirements.
EXHIBIT 1
VARIABLE COSTS AND CONTRIBUTIO NS
O F FA LL-LIN E PRODUCTS, 1966

DAPPER

Per Lot of 100 Item s
D IG G ER
D IV ER

Selling p r i c e ........................................

$650

$690

$860

Costs:
Variable labor
Raw materials
Variable m achine time
Finishing, inspection, packing
M iscellaneous ..........................

$150
160
155
15
5

$220
80
175
15
5

$245
240
135
10
5

Total ....................................

$485

$495

$635

$165

$195

$225

Gross contribution per lot
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It now became possible to formulate the “profit function” for these
lines. If each 100-lot of “Dappers” produces a contribution of $165,
each lot of “Diggers” a contribution of $195 and each lot of “Divers,”
$225, then the total contribution will obviously be: $165 (No. of lots
of Dappers) + $195 (No. of lots of Diggers) + $225 (No. of lots of
Divers). In stating the formula the number of lots of Dappers pro
duced was assumed to be A; the number of lots of Diggers produced U;
and the number of lots of Divers produced I. The formula was then
expressed as:
Maximum profit, Z = 165A + 195U + 225I
The next step was to find a similar mathematical formulation for the
various factors which might limit the company’s ability to produce any
particular product mix —the scarce resources; money, machine availa
bility and labor. The group decided to tackle the machine-time problem
first. (Note: In linear programing, it is usual to refer to these “limited
resource” factors as constraints, and this term will be used in the
remainder of this case.)
The Cutting Machine Constraint
Two large cutting machines were available. Mr. Murphy explained
that the first step was to determine how much cutting machine time
would be available. Mr. Ogden said that it was necessary to complete
all cutting sometime before the end of the complete production run.
After some discussion, Mr. Ogden and Mr. Pringle decided that 36
working days of cutting machine time would be available, and that
after making allowance for all down-time (see Exhibit 2, page 73),
the total machine time available would be 27,000 minutes.
The next step was to determine the cutting machine time re
quirements of the various lines. Mr. Pringle was able to supply this
information, having made an informal study of the machine time
required for various models and materials so that the information was
available to him for scheduling purposes. The Digger required more
time than the Dapper; the material used for this line was considerably
thicker than the other two and the “stack” of material which could be
cut out at one time consisted of fewer thicknesses. The Diver required
even more time; the material used for this line was thin but the design
required extra panels to be cut. Mr. Pringle estimated that the Dapper
required one hour of machine time per lot, the Digger two hours and
the Diver three hours. Converting all these to minutes, and using the
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EXHIBIT 2
CALCULATION OF CUTTING MACHINE TIME AVAILABLE
W orking day = 9 hours = 540 minutes
Less: M aintenance and re p a irs .........................................
Daily setup time ........................................................
Parts c h a n g e ................................................................
Labor breaks: lunch, etc............................................
Blade changing and recalibration ........................

20
35
20
50
40
165

Running tim e per m achine per day = 375
375 X 2 ( m achines) X 36 ( work days available) = 27,000

same symbolic representation as before, it was possible to formulate
the constraint:
60 A + 120 U + 180I

27,000
≤

The Stitching Machine Constraint
The problem of stitching machine availability was treated in a similar
manner. Eight heavy duty stitching machines were available and were
used to piece together the main panels and sew the major seams; minor
operations such as stitching pockets and cuffs were done subsequently
on smaller machines. The Digger, with its sturdier construction, re
quired two extra seams per pair. Mr. Pringle had recently performed
an informal time study on stitching operations and was able to supply
the information that the Dapper and Diver lines required six minutes
stitching per pair, and the Digger eight minutes.
Total available machine time was calculated on the basis used for
the cutting machines, but in the case of the stitching machines, 44
working days were estimated to be available. The calculation is shown
in Exhibit 3, page 74.
Rounding the machine time available and converting the minutes
required per pair to minutes per lot, it was possible to formulate the
constraint:
600 A + 800 U + 600 I ≤ 124,000.
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EXHIBIT 3
CALCULATION O F ST ITC H IN G M A CH IN E T IM E AVAILABLE
W orking day = 9 hours = 540 m inutes
Less: M aintenance and re p a irs .........................................
Setup time ...................................................................
L abor breaks ...............................................................
H andling and alignm ent of m aterials ..................

18
32
66
72
188

Running tim e per m achine per day = 352 minutes
352 X 8 (m achines) X 44 (w orking days) = 123,904 minutes

The Labor Constraint
After the stitching of the main seams on the stitching machines, the
garments were passed to a group of female workers, operating smaller
sewing machines, who stitched the pockets, cuffs, and belt loops. This
work was not “machine controlled” —rather, the time taken per gar
ment depended upon the skill and experience of the worker. The
company found it increasingly difficult to recruit suitable operators and
Mr. Ogden considered that this stage certainly could be a limiting
factor in the production schedule. It was necessary, therefore, to
formulate this activity also into a constraint.
The work in this area did not start until a reasonable stock of cut and
seam-stitched articles had been built up; Mr. Pringle estimated that 39
working days would be available. Twenty operators were available, so
the available labor time was 39 X 20 = 780 man-days.
The labor-time requirements of the various lines were readily avail
able, both from past piece-payment records and from the time studies
upon which the piece rates had been based. The standard rate of pro
duction for the Dapper was one-third of a lot per worker per day, more
usefully expressed as three man-days per lot. The Digger required six
man-days per lot, and the Diver, which required particular care and
attention, eight man-days per lot. The labor constraint, then, could be
formulated:
3 A + 6 U +8I ≤
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The Financial Constraint
The group then turned to the more complex problem of formulating
the threatened cash shortage as a constraint equation. The first step
was to gather all of the relevant information together. The company’s
cash balance at this time (May 18) was approximately $19,000. The
amount available for the purchase of materials, however, would depend
upon the other expected cash flows during the production period. A
cash-flow forecast for the period was therefore necessary. Most of the
information required for such a forecast was available, except one
essential item, the “minimum permissible cash,” below which the bal
ance should not fall. Mr. Ogden admitted that he had never formulated
such an amount. After discussion with the bookkeeper, Miss Dawson,
it was decided that $12,000 would provide more than adequate pro
vision for any unforeseen event, and this figure was used for planning
purposes. The cash-flow forecast that was then compiled is reproduced
in Exhibit 4, below.
The cash-flow forecast indicated that the cash surplus above “mini
mum requirements” would fall to a low point of $2,000 in July. Of the
cash currently available and the net cash inflows during the period,
therefore, only $2,000 could safely be used for raw-materials purchases.
Two other sources of financing raw materials were available, how
ever: trade credit and existing inventory. Mr. Ogden believed that he
could without difficulty obtain credit up to $20,000 from his main
raw-material supplier, a large textile manufacturers’ agent and broker,
EXHIBIT 4
CASH FL O W FORECA ST FO R FA LL-LIN E PRO D U C TIO N PER IO D
June

July

August

Cash at beginning of period ...............................

$19,000

$26,000

$14,000

Receipts (sale of summer line) ...........................
Payments ( excluding purchases of m aterials)

$36,000
29,000

$34,000
46,000

$32,000
27,000

N et inflow (outflow ) ............................................

$ 7,000 $(12,000)

$ 5,000

Cash at the end of p e r io d ......................................

$26,000

$14,000

$19,000

Minimum cash level ..............................................
Cash surplus (deficit) ............................................

12,000
14,000

12,000
2,000

12,000
7,000
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and that it would not be necessary to repay any part of this sum until
the receipts from the sale of fall lines became realized in September
and October. (The large cash outflow of $46,000 scheduled in July in
the cash-flow forecast included repayment of a $15,000 credit from this
same source for summer-line materials).
Mr. Ogden also pointed out that some of the materials used for
summer lines could also be used for the Dapper fall line. The use of
such material on hand would in effect represent a saving in cash equal
to the present market value of that material; this market value should
therefore be added into “available cash.” A brief examination of the
stock records showed that this material amounted to $3,600. The cash
available could now be formulated: $2,000 + $20,000 + $3,600 =
$25,600. At this point Mr. Ogden raised a question:
Ogden:

I don’t know how realistic this figure is. As I told you, I have
decided to go to the bank and approach them about a short
term loan. I’m sure they will lend me at least $10,000. Don’t
you think we should include that in the available cash?

Murphy: No, I don’t. I think the loan is a separate issue. You should
first determine your optimum product mix without the bank
loan and the profit that the mix would produce. Then you
can go a step further and calculate the extra profit you would
make if you had the bank loan, and whether the loan would
be worthwhile.
Having determined the figure to be used for “available cash,” the
next step was to find the cash requirements (material cost) of the
various lines. This information was available from the company’s
elementary standard-cost system. The Dapper required $160 of mate
rials per lot, the cheaper heavy denim and cotton-cord materials used
for the Digger, $80 per lot; and the drip-dry minimum iron materials
for the Diver, $240 per lot. All these amounts included allowance for
normal wastage. It was then possible to formulate the financial con
straint in these terms:
160 A

80 U ) 240 I ≤ 25,600

The Demand Constraint
Mr. Murphy was pleased with the progress made so far and believed
that the problem had now been expressed in a form that could be solved
by the linear programing technique. One final matter still bothered
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him, however. Mr. Ogden believed that the company could sell more
than it would be able to produce in the coming season and had therefore
left demand completely out of his calculations. Mr. Murphy doubted
the wisdom of this decision. He believed that the firm obviously could
not sell an infinite amount of the fall line, and that the situation would
be more realistically formulated if a demand constraint were to be
included. He asked Mr. Ogden the highest demand that he could
imagine experiencing for the fall lines.
Mr. Ogden thought for a while, then said: “Well, last year we had
orders for more than we could turn out. The orders amounted to about
300 lots —maybe a bit more. That was certainly more than we have
ever had before. I think it could be bigger still this year, though.”
Murphy : How much higher? Could it be 400 lots?
Ogden:

No —I don’t think so. But I think it could be fairly close to it.

Murphy: About 350 lots?
Ogden:

No, more like 380 lots.

On that basis Mr. Murphy decided to take 380 lots as the maximum
foreseeable demand. Obviously, therefore, the total production of all
lines could not be allowed to exceed that figure, and therefore, the fol
lowing constraint was formulated:
A + U + I ≤ 380
Solving the Problem

Mr. Murphy now had all the information he needed to formulate the
problem for solution by the Simplex method of linear programing. He
set out the equations that had been derived:
Maximize Z = 165 A + 195 U + 225 I
Given the Constraints:
60 A + 120 U + 180 I ≤ 27,000
600 A + 800
124,000
≤
+ 600 I
3A +
780
6 +
8 I≤
160 A + 80
+ 240 I ≤ 25,600
A +
I ≤
380
+

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

He then proceeded to restate these equations in the form of a Simplex
tableau by adding slack variables to each of them. This is simply a way
of converting these expressions, which are called equations but in fact
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are inequalities, into true equations. An additional term is added to
each inequality. This term represents the time or cost which is not
expended. The effect is to change the "equal to or less than” sign, ≤ ,
into the normal “equals” sign. This is best illustrated by an example.
The cutting machine constraint, inequality (2), states that “cutting
machine time spent on producing the Dapper plus time on the Digger
plus time on the Diver must in total be equal to or less than 27,000
minutes.”
Now, by adding a slack (or dummy) variable, P, which is time not
spent on any of the products (that is, potential running time during
which a cutting machine is idle), the inequality can now be turned into
an equality or true equation, thus:
60 A + 120 U + 180I + P = 27,000
and the interpretation is now straightforward and obvious: “The total
cutting machine time spent on the Dapper plus time on the Digger plus
time on the Diver plus that time in which the machine or machines
could have been used but are in fact idle will amount to exactly 27,000
minutes.”
Similar slack variables were added to inequalities (3) through (6),
and Murphy proceeded to solve the problem by deriving successive
Simplex matrices until an optimum solution was obtained. The succes
sive matrices are given as an appendix (see page 82). (The reader
who is unfamiliar with the Simplex method and wishes to have a stepby-step explanation of the procedure is advised to consult one of the
basic texts listed in the bibliography. The book by Metzger is recom
mended as the best introduction to the mechanics of the technique.)
Mr. Murphy completed his solution and turned to Mr. Ogden.
Murphy: Well, Bob, here is the answer, but I think it may make a lot
more sense to you if I work right through the solution with
you and try to show you what is happening at each step.
Ogden:

Please do that. It looks terrifying at the moment, and I don’t
really see how you have produced an answer at all, or why
you say that it is the optimal one.

Murphy: Well, first of all I look at the profit Junction. The profit per
lot on the Diver is considerably higher than either of the
others, so it is a reasonable starting point to say that you will
make as much of the Diver as possible. Then you must look
to see which factor is the limiting one, which constraint you
78

MODERN WEAR, INC.

encounter first. As you can see it is the labor constraint. The
labor shortage limits your production of the Diver to 97.5
lots, and you would have 9,450 minutes of unused cutting
machine time, 65,500 minutes of unused stitching machine
time and $2,200 of unused cash from the amount allocated
for materials purchases.
Now look at the effect that introducing a second item into
the line would have. The Dapper offers more additional profit
than the Digger ($80.62 per lot against $26.25 per lot), there
fore that line is introduced into the mix. The result is a pro
gram of 31.43 lots of the Dapper, with the Diver falling to
85.71 lots. The total profit is now $24,300: that is, $2,300
more than if you made the Diver alone. The matrix now indi
cates, however, that we can increase profits even more by
introducing some Diggers into the mix.
The revised program resulting from the introduction of
the Digger is interesting. The Digger takes up all the re
maining slack time on the stitching machines. The Diver
schedule is cut to only 7.5 lots, but the resources freed by this
reduction make it possible to increase the Dapper schedule
up to 118.13 lots. This mix gives a total profit of $33,010, an
increase of $8,000 over the two-product mix.
The matrix indicates at this point that there is no additional
profit to be made by further changes or substitutions; all
marginal contributions are now negative or zero. The opti
mum product mix, therefore, is:
Dapper:
Digger:
Diver:

118.13 lots
60.63 lots
7.5 lots

So there you are. That is your optimum product mix, if all
the figures you have given me are reasonably correct.
Ogden:

But Mike, this looks crazy. The Diver is my most profitable
il n e and you are telling me to cut production of it down,
almost to nothing!

Murphy: No, Bob, the Diver isn’t your most profitable line, not when
you look at it in the context of the overall production plan.
One of your main problems is your shortage of labor for the
finishing operations, and the Diver line requires so much
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labor that this area becomes a bottleneck. You can produce
very little of the other lines and you end up with the cutting
and stitching machines standing idle. Reducing the Diver
schedule gives you a much more balanced production pat
tern, and your total profits rise accordingly.
Ogden:

I see. That begins to make sense. Now, what about the loan
question? You said that you would be able to tell me whether
or not it was worth borrowing money to finance more mate
rials purchases.

Murphy: Right. This is one of the most useful aspects of this type of
analysis. The final tableau shows that at the point at which
our optimal solution was obtained, the available cash was
one of the effective constraints. That means that if we had
more cash available, we could continue the process of sub
stitution to give us an even better mix, up to the point at
which cash was not an effective constraint and we came up
against some other limiting factor. We can even get a pretty
good idea of how much you should try to borrow by increas
ing the “available cash” constraint by different amounts and
calculating the resulting change in total profits. In fact, we
will try one such assumption right now and see how it works
out. Let’s assume that available cash is increased by $10,000
and work out the effect of that.
Mr. Murphy then began to rework his solution with the revised as
sumption. (That is, inequality (5) had now been changed to read
160 A + 80 U + 2401≤ 35,600.)
After about 25 minutes he said: “There we are. On that assumption
you get a very different product mix. The answer is now:
Dapper:
Digger:
Diver:

173 lots
nil
33 lots

“This is a pretty radical change, but again it makes sense. With all
that additional cash, the cash constraint is no longer effective. The
limiting factor now is going to be the stitching machines. The Digger,
with its extra seams, is the line that requires most stitching time and it
is dropped from the mix. The total profit now would be $36,000; and
that is $3,000 more than the previous solution promised. Of course, you
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would have to pay interest on the loan, but assuming a rate of 6 per cent
per annum, the total interest for three months would be just $150 which
leaves you a very nice profit margin.”
Ogden:

You know, I think you have really got something here. What
should my next move be?

Murphy: I would like to spend a few days going over the assumptions
we have used to make sure that the formulation of the con
straints is the best available. Then I think it might be a good
idea to use a “sensitivity analysis” approach, to change vari
ous assumptions and see what effect the change makes on the
results. For instance, I could ask, “W hat if you employed
another five skilled workers?” or, “What if you ran the stitch
ing machines on a two-shift basis?” and find out what the
results would be. After that, I think you will really be in a
position to do some planning.
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Stages in the Simplex Solution of the Product-Mix Problem
1. Formulating the inequalities:
160 A + 8 0 U + 240I ≤ 25,600
600 A + 800U + 600I ≤ 124,000
3A +6U +
8I ≤
780
60 A + 120U + 180I ≤ 27,000
A+ U+
I≤
380
2. Introducing the slack variables:
* Note: At this point, some of the inequalities have been divided
by a common denominator to simplify subsequent calcu
lations. The first line has been divided by 80, the second
by 200 and the fourth by 60.
2A
3A
3A
A
A

+ U + 3I +
+ 4U + 3 I +
+ 6U + 8 I +
+ 2U + 3 I +
+ U + I+

P =
Q=
R=
S=
T=

320
620
780
450
380

3. Showing coefficients of slack variables:
2A
3A
3A
1A
1A

+ 1U+
+ 4 U+
+ 6U +
+ 2 U+
+1U+

3I+
3I+
8I +
3I+
1I+

1P
0P
0P
0P
0P

+
+
+
+
+

0Q +
1Q +
0Q +
0Q +
0Q+

0R +
0R +
lR +
0R +
0R +

0S+
0S+
0S +
1S +
0S+

0T =
0T=
0T =
0T=
1T =

320
620
780
450
380

The profit function is now:
165 A + 195 U + 225 I + 0 P + 0 Q + 0 R + 0 S + 0 T = Z
—obviously all idle time is unprofitable.
4. Setting up the first tableau:
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Restate the array in matrix form with the constraint
maximum to the left:
T A U I
P Q R S
1 3
0 2
320 =
1 0 0 0
0 3 4
3
620
0 1 0 0
8
780 = 0 0
1 0
0 3 6
1 2 3
450 = 0 0 0 1 0
380 = 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
The first tableau is now constructed. See page 85.
The index row at the foot of this tableau plays a vital part in the
next step. It has been developed by the following formula:
Number in index row = Σ [all numbers in that column multiplied
by the corresponding number in the
objective column] minus the number
in the objective row at the head of the
column.
For the A column, the index number is determined thus:
2X 0 = 0
3X 0 = 0
3X 0 = 0
1X 0 = 0
1X 0 = 0
Σ =

0
165

= —

165

These index-row numbers indicate the relative extent to which the
solution could be improved by introducing into the solution the vari
able at the head of that particular column. In this instance the variable
to be introduced is obviously I.
The next step is to calculate which variable currently in the solution
will be replaced by I. The I column will be called the key column for
this tableau. This is done by dividing each number in the constant
column by the corresponding positive non-zero number in the key
column:
320 ÷ 3 = 106.7
620 ÷ 3 = 206.7
780 ÷ 8 = 97.5
450 ÷ 3 = 150.0
380 ÷ 1 = 380.0
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The smallest of these quotients, in this case 97.5, is then selected.
This now becomes the key row. The variable shown in the variable
column for this row, R, will therefore be dropped from the solution in
favor of I. The number at the crossing point of the key row and key
column is called the key number: In this example, it is 8 as indicated in
the first tableau.
It is now possible to construct the next tableau, known as the first
iteration. The first step is to take the key row from the first tableau
and divide it throughout by the key number:
780
0
0
1
0
0
3
6
8

÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
÷
÷

8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

97.5
0
0
0.125
0
0
0.375
0.75
1

This new row is inserted into the new tableau in place of the old
key row. The appropriate variable and objective are also inserted at
the left of this row: I and 225 respectively.
The tableau is completed by taking each remaining number from
the first tableau and applying formula to it:
Old number minus: (corresponding number in key row multiplied
by corresponding number in key column)
divided by key number
Thus, to obtain the new constant column entry for the P row, we have:
320 -

(780 X 3)
8

= 320 - 2340
8
= 320 - 292.5
= 27.5
The remainder of the tableau is constructed in the same manner.
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1

380

3

450

8

780

3

620

3

320

0

0

Objective
Column

0

0

0

P

T

S

R

0

380

450

780

620

320

Variable
Column

Q

Constant
Column

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

Q

P
1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

R

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

S

0

0

0

0

1

1

3

3

2

A

165

1

2

U

195

6

4

1

1

3

[8]

3

3

I

225

0 -1 6 5 -1 9 5 -225

1

0

T

0

Index Row

Constraint
Equations

Objective
Row
Variable
Row
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.625

282.5

—.125

157.5

.375

97.5

1.875

327.5

.875

27.5

0

0

225

0

0

T

S

I

Q

P

5. First iteration:

21,937.5

282.5

157.5

97.5

327.5

27.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

Q

P

1

0

0

28.125

—.125

—.375

.125

—.375

—.375

R

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

S

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

T

0

—80.625

.625

—.125

.375

1.875

.875

A

165

—26.25

.25

—.25

.75

1.75

—1.25

U

195

0

0

0

1

0

0

I

225

Index Row

Constraints

Variable
Row

Objective
Row
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Q

I

S

T

0

225

0

0

—.715

92.07

24,300.7

.143

—.429

—2.14

1.143

0

0

0

0

1

0

Q

P

262.85

161.43

85.71

268.57

31.43

0

0

—6.375

.143

—.43

.287

.43

—.43

R

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

S

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

T

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

A

165

—140.7

1.143

—.43

1.29

4.43

-1.43

U

195

I

0

0

0

1

0

0

225

Index Row

Constraints

Variable
Row

Objective
Row

Again, the key column, row and number are calculated and the next tableau can be constructed:

A

165

6. Second iteration:

A new key column, key row and key number are now calculated as before, and the second iteration is
calculated:

88

24.7

—.166

—.063

.190

—.48

32.3

—.263
7.4

.032

—.388

.162

.097

—.291

R

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

S

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

T

0

No negative numbers:
indicative that optimum
has been reached

.099

—.297

.23

.329

Q

P
.457

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

A

0

0

0

0

1

0

U

1

0

0

0

0

0

I

165 195 225

Index Row

Constraints

Variable
Row

Objective
Row

It can now be seen that there are no negative figures left in the index row, and therefore no new
index column can be calculated. This indicates that the solution cannot be further improved by intro
ducing any other variables into the current solution. The optimum product mix can now be read from
the constant column, and the index row entry at the foot of this column indicates the expected profit
for this solution.

Solution

33,010

193.5

7.50

T

I

225

60.3

187.5

U

195

118.3

S

A

165

7. Final iteration:

